

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

ARAGEN BIOSCIENCE, INC.
AND
TRANSPOSAGEN BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.

KYOWA HAKKO KIRIN CO., LTD.,
Patent Owner.

Case IPR2017-01254
Patent 8,067,232 B2

Before JAMES T. MOORE, ERICA A. FRANKLIN, and
ROBERT A. POLLOCK, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

POLLOCK, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION
Denying Institution of *Inter Partes* Review
37 C.F.R. § 42.108

I. INTRODUCTION

Aragen Bioscience, Inc. and Transposagen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Petitioner”)¹ filed a Petition requesting an *inter partes* review of claims 1–5 of U.S. Patent No. 8,067,232 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’232 Patent”). Paper 1 (“Pet.”). Kyowa Hakko Kirin Co., Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response to the Petition. Paper 9 (“Prelim. Resp.”).

Institution of an *inter partes* review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition . . . and any response . . . shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314; *see* 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.4, 42.108. Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in showing the unpatentability of at least one challenged claim. Accordingly, we decline to institute an *inter partes* review of the ’232 Patent.

A. *Related Applications and Proceedings*

The ’232 Patent shares substantially the same specification with U.S. Patent Nos. 7,425,446 B2 (“the ’446 Patent”), 7,737,325 B2 (“the ’325 Patent”), and 6,946,292 B2 (“the ’292 Patent”), which are related as follows. The ’232 Patent issued from Application No. 12/048,348 (“the ’348 Application”), which is a continuation of Application No. 11/287,359 (now the ’325 Patent), which is a divisional of Application No. 09/971,773 (now the ’292 Patent). This chain of continuations and divisionals was first filed

¹ Petitioner further identifies GVK Biosciences, Private Limited and GVK Davix Technologies Private Limited as real parties-in-interest. Pet. 57.

on October 9, 2001, and each patent in the family claims benefit of provisional Application No. 60/268,916, filed February 16, 2001, as well as foreign applications PCT/JP01/08804 and JP 2000-308526, filed October 5, 2001, and October 6, 2000, respectively.

In addition to the instant Petition challenging claims 1–5 of the '232 Patent, Petitioner has submitted Petitions challenging claims of the '446 Patent (IPR2017-01262), and the '292 Patent (IPR2017-01252). Petitioner does not presently challenge the '325 Patent.

According to the parties, the '232 Patent is at issue in *Kyowa Hakko Kirin Co. v. Aragen Bioscience, Inc.*, Case No. 3-16-cv-05993-JD (N.D. Cal.) (“the copending district court litigation”). Pet. 57; Paper 5.

B. The '232 Patent and Relevant Background


The '232 Patent, titled “Antibody Composition-Producing Cell with Inactivated A-1,6-fucosyltransferase,” relates to the development of host cells for the production of antibody molecules that enhance antibody-dependent cytotoxicity (ADCC). *See* Ex. 1001, 5:37–43. As explained by Petitioner, ADCC is an inflammatory response mediated by NK (natural killer) cells that can result in the killing of tumor cells. *See* Pet. 3–4 (citing Ex. 1026² ¶¶ 21–24).

In ADCC, the Fc portions of IgG-type antibodies decorating a target cell (e.g., a tumor cell) are recognized by Fc receptors (e.g., FcγRIII or CD16) on the NK cell surface. *Id.* The interaction between target cell-specific antibodies and Fc receptors activates the NK cell, which then kills the target cell. *Id.* According to the Specification, the Fc region of IgG-type

² Declaration of Dr. Royston Jefferis.

antibodies contains two complex-type, N-glycoside-linked oligosaccharide (sugar) chains, which are known to greatly influence ADCC activity. *See generally* Ex. 1001, 1:44–5:34. Despite prior art attempts to explore this structure-function relationship, the inventors of the '232 Patent assert that, “a truly important sugar chain structure has not been specified yet.” *Id.* at 2:13–41, 5:20–34; *see also, id.* at 2:38–41 (stating that, whereas “structures of sugar chains [on IgG-type antibodies] are various and complex, and it cannot be said that an actual important structure for the effector function was identified”).

N-linked sugar chains comprise a common core structure illustrated in formula (I) of the '292 Patent, reproduced below.



Id. at 2:55–60. Formula (I) shows the common core structure of N-linked oligosaccharide chains comprising a branched arrangement of mannose sugars (Man) and two N-acetyl glucosamine residues (GlcNAc). The mannose end of the core is referred to as the “non-reducing end,” and the terminal GlcNAc end the “reducing end.” At the non-reducing end, enzymatic attachment and modification of additional sugars moieties result high mannose-, hybrid-, or complex-type sugar chains, depending on the number and type of residues added. *See generally, id.* at 2:42–3:7; *see also* Prelim. Resp., 5–6 (illustrating high mannose-, hybrid, and complex-type sugar chains). At the reducing end, the terminal GlcNAc is linked to the amino acid asparagine (“N” or “Asn”) of a polypeptide chain. *Id.* In the Fc

region of an antibody, a terminal GlcNAc at the reducing end of a complex-type oligosaccharide chain is attached to each of the two antibody heavy chains; the 6 position of the terminal GlcNAc may bear a fucose moiety added by α 1,6-fucosyltransferase. *See id.* at 3:8–4:5, 20:44–55, 22:49–53, 22:60–23:35.

According to the Specification, reducing or eliminating the addition of fucose at the reducing end of N-linked oligosaccharide chains of the Fc region significantly improves the ADCC response. *See generally*, Ex. 1001, 5:35–67, 7:5–8:18. The Specification also discloses the design and testing of a mammalian host cell line for producing antibodies where the FUT8 gene—the gene encoding α 1,6-fucosyltransferase—was disrupted, thereby reducing or eliminating α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity. *Id.*; *see generally*, Ex. 1001, 7:15–43, 97:4–110:25; *see, e.g.*, 110:23–25 (“ADCC activity of produced antibodies can be improved by disrupting the FUT8 allele in host cells”); Ex. 1037³ 89:16–22.

In particular, Example 12 of the Specification details the cloning of exon 2 of a mammalian FUT 8 gene using a Fut8 cDNA probe.⁴ Ex. 1001, 97:4–98:20. In Example 13, the genomic DNA was then used to “knock out” or create a deletion in the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase gene of mammalian cells. *Id.* at 98:22–110:25. Antibodies produced in cells bearing the disrupted α 1,6-fucosyltransferase gene “showed a significantly more potent

³ Transcript of Dr. Brian Van Ness Deposition taken in the copending district court litigation.

⁴ According to the Specification, the process involved designing PCR primers based on “a mouse FUT8 cDNA sequence (GenBank, AB025198).” *Id.* at 97:15–20.

ADCC activity than the antibody produced by the strain . . . before gene disruption.” *Id.* at 110:16–25, Fig. 42.

C. Representative Claim

Claim 1, the sole dependent claim, recites,

1. An isolated mammalian host cell which has no α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity for adding fucose to N-acetylglucosamine of a reducing terminus of N-Glycoside-linked sugar chains by deleting a genomic gene encoding α 1,6-fucosyltransferase or by adding a mutation to said genomic gene to eliminate the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity, wherein said host cell is selected from the group consisting of a CHO cell, a NS0 cell, an SP2/0 cell, and a YB2/0 cell.

Depending from claim 1, claims 2–5 are each limited to one of the host cell types specified in claim 1.

D. The Asserted Prior art and Grounds of Unpatentability

Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 17):

Ground	Reference(s)	Basis	Claims
1	Rothman, ⁵ Umaña, ⁶ knowledge of POSA	§ 103	1–5
2	Harris, ⁷ Umaña, knowledge of POSA	§ 103	1–5

⁵ Rothman et al., *Antibody-dependent cytotoxicity mediated by natural killer cells is enhanced by castanospermine-induced alterations of IgG glycosylation*, 26(12) MOLEC. IMMUNOL. 1113–23 (1989). Ex. 1002.

⁶ WO 99/54342, published Oct. 28, 1999. Ex. 1004.

⁷ Harris et al., *Refined structure of an intact IgG2a monoclonal antibody*, 36 Biochemistry 1581–97 (1997). Ex. 1003.

Ground	Reference(s)	Basis	Claims
3	Rothman, Umaña, Malý, ⁸ knowledge of POSA	§ 103	1–5
4	Harris, Umaña, Malý, knowledge of POSA	§ 103	1–5
5	Rothman, Umaña, Gao, ⁹ knowledge of POSA	§ 103	5
6	Harris, Umaña, Gao, knowledge of POSA	§ 103	5

Petitioner also relies on the Declarations of Dr. Brian G. Van Ness (Ex. 1007) and Dr. Royston Jefferis (Ex. 1026). Petitioner further relies on the June 22, 2017, transcript of the deposition testimony of Dr. Brian Van Ness taken in the copending district court litigation (Exhibit 1038), and a supplemental paper relating to that testimony (Paper 12), both of which were entered in this case subject to the Board’s Order of August 9, 2017 (Paper 11).

E. Overview of the Asserted References

i. Rothman (Ex. 1002)

Rothman describes the functional analysis of monoclonal IgG antibodies (“mAbs”) produced in culture in the presence of various glycosylation inhibitors. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1002, Abstract, 1121.¹⁰ Rothman

⁸ Malý et al., *The $\alpha(1,3)$ fucosyltransferase Fuc-TVII controls leukocyte trafficking through an essential role in L-, E-, and P-selectin ligand biosynthesis*, 86 CELL 643–53 (1996). Ex. 1005.

⁹ Gao et al., *Characterization of YB2/0 cell line by counterflow centrifugation elutriation*, 44 Exp. Toxic. Pathol. 435–38 (1992). Ex. 1006.

¹⁰ Where possible, we refer to the native page numbers of the exhibits.

reports that, although oligosaccharide modification did not significantly influence antigen binding to target cells, “a correlation was observed between the efficiency of promoting ADCC and the glycosylation phenotype of the mAb.” *Id.* at 1121. In particular, ADCC was enhanced when the IgG oligosaccharides were metabolically modified by exposure to castanospermine (Cs) and certain other inhibitors. *See, e.g., id.* at Abstract, 1121. Rothman suggests that “absence of core fucosylation itself would appear to be a likely candidate as a structural feature necessary for enhancement of NK cell-mediated ADCC.” *Id.* at 1122; *see also id.* (“[I]t is tempting to speculate that polyclonal variability in the expression of core fucosylation may confer a functional advantage to host defense by diversifying the effector activity of IgG.”).

ii. Harris (Ex. 1003)

Harris describes the crystal structure (including oligosaccharide components) of an IgG-type monoclonal antibody directed against a canine lymphoma. *See* Ex. 1003, Abstract, 1591–92. In comparing the Fc region of the canine antibody against that of a human antibody, Harris states that,

the principal differences lie in the orientation and placement of Fuc2 and of the branch ends Gal7 and Nag9 (Figure 10).¹¹ The fucose residue may be of particular interest. In both this antibody and the human Fc it interacts with Tyr313 [of the IgG heavy chain], but the interactions are quite different in the two cases. This fucose is also near the Fc γ receptor binding site and could influence binding by the receptor.

Id. at 1592. With respect to effector function, Harris further states:

¹¹ We understand Fuc2, Gal7, and Nag9 to refer to specifically numbered sugar moieties (fucose, galactose, and N-acetyl glucosamine, respectively) of the IgG oligosaccharide chains.

No direct evidence, that we know of, suggests that the oligosaccharides form part of any effector binding site. Degradation or modification of the carbohydrate has, however, been clearly shown to eliminate or reduce effector functions such as . . . binding to Fc receptors

Id. at 1593–94.

iii. Umaña (Ex. 1004)

Umaña is directed to the production of antibodies and other proteins having altered glycosylation patterns that provide improved therapeutic properties. Ex. 1004, Abstract, 2. In particular, Umaña states that,

the present invention is directed to a method for producing altered glycoforms of proteins having improved therapeutic values, *e.g.*, an antibody which has an enhanced antibody dependent cellular cytotoxicity (ADCC), in a host cell. The invention provides host cells which harbor a nucleic acid encoding the protein of interest, *e.g.*, an antibody, and at least one nucleic acid encoding a glycoprotein-modifying glycosyl transferase.

Id. at 3:6–11. Among the techniques taught by Umaña, are “the use of gene knockout technologies . . . to tailor the host cell’s glycosyl transferase and/or glycosidase expression levels.” *Id.* at 15:20–22.

iv. Malý (Ex. 1005)

According to Malý, five genes (Fuc-TVII, Fuc-TIII, V, VI, and TIV) encode $\alpha(1,3)$ fucosyltransferases in humans. Ex. 1005, 649; *see id.* at 643. Malý discloses the targeted disruption of the mouse homolog of Fuc-TVII, and the generation of mice homozygous for the knockout of this gene. Ex. 1005, 644.

According to Malý, “mice deficient in $\alpha(1,3)$ fucosyltransferase Fuc-TVII exhibit a leukocyte adhesion deficiency characterized by absent

leukocyte E- and P-selectin ligand activity and deficient HEV¹²-L-selectin ligand activity.” *Id.*, Abstract. Malý indicates that “Fuc-TVII decorates the oligosaccharide components of these glycoproteins with $\alpha(1,3)$ fucose residues essential to effective E- and P-selectin ligand activity.” *Id.* at 649.

v. Gao (Ex. 1006)

Gao describes the separation of YB2/0 cells into cell fractions according to cell cycle stages using counterflow centrifugal elutriation. Ex. 1006, 435. According to Gao, “[t]he YB2/0 plasmacytoma cell line is a highly efficient partner for the production of hybridomas.” *Id.* at 437.

II. ANALYSIS

a. Principles of Law

A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which that subject matter pertains. *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved based on underlying factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness, if present. *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). Although the *KSR* test is flexible, we “must still be careful not to allow hindsight reconstruction of references . . . without any explanation as to *how* or *why*

¹² Short for high endothelial venules, cells which express specific adhesion molecules such as this ligand.

the references would be combined to produce the claimed invention.” *TriVascular, Inc. v. Samuels*, 812 F.3d 1056, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

“In an [*inter partes* review], the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable.” *Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc.*, 815 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring *inter partes* review petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each claim”)). This burden of persuasion never shifts to Patent Owner. See *Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.*, 800 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing the burden of proof in *inter partes* review). “To satisfy its burden of proving obviousness, a petitioner cannot employ mere conclusory statements. The petitioner must instead articulate specific reasoning, based on evidence of record, to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” *In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.*, 829 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 418).

We analyze the challenges presented in the Petition in accordance with the above-stated principles.

A. *Claim Construction*

In an *inter partes* review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are interpreted according to their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); *Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee*, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation standard). Under that standard, we presume that a claim term carries its “ordinary and customary meaning,” which “is the meaning that the term would have to a

person of ordinary skill in the art in question” at the time of the invention. *In re Translogic Tech., Inc.*, 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

Petitioner proposes that the terms of the challenged claims should be accorded their “plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Pet. 16–17. Patent Owner does not presently contest Petitioner’s position. Prelim. Resp. 20. At this stage of the proceeding, we find that no explicit construction of any claim term is necessary to determine whether to institute a trial in this case. *See Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co.*, 642 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[C]laim terms need only be construed ‘to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.’” (quoting *Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc.*, 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).

B. Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art.

According to Petitioner, one of ordinary skill in the art as of the earliest possible filing date of the invention would have had A) “knowledge of the scientific literature . . . concerning the means and methods for creating cells in which the gene for the fucose-adding enzyme fucosyltransferase was knocked out, resulting in a modified sugar chain giving improved antibodies” and, B) “a doctorate in molecular immunology or biochemistry of glycoproteins including antibodies, knowledge of routine genetic procedures including gene ‘knock-outs,’ and a few years’ practical experience working on the genetics of antibodies.” Pet. 16 (citing Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 11–13; Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 18–20). Petitioner further directs us to the level of skill in the art indicated by Applicants during prosecution. *Id.* (citing Ex. 1036-B, Aug. 12, 2004 Amendment at 32–35) (indicating, for example,

that the state of the art with respect to genetic manipulation techniques was “quite advanced”).

Patent Owner does not propose an alternative definition. *See* Prelim. Resp. 17–20. Patent Owner argues, however, that the cited references fail to disclose to “the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase gene, or any method of deleting or adding a mutation to the genomic gene,” such that part A) of Petitioner’s proposed definition is merely an attempt to “make up for the missing elements and the missing motivation to combine in the prior art references they cite” (*id.* at 2, 17–18). We agree with Patent Owner to the extent that part A) of Petitioner’s proposed definition avoids the salient issue, discussed in section II(C)(iii), below, of whether Petitioner has established that the prior art discloses a mammalian α 1,6-fucosyltransferase gene, or any method of deleting or adding a mutation to the genomic α 1,6-fucosyltransferase gene, as required by the challenged claims.

Accordingly, on this record, we adopt part B) of Petitioner’s definition of the level of ordinary skill in the art. Specifically – a person of ordinary skill in the art would have had a doctorate level degree in a field concerned with molecular immunology or biochemistry of glycoproteins including antibodies, knowledge of routine generic genetic procedures including gene knock-outs, and a few years practical experience working on the genetics of antibodies.

We further note that the prior art itself demonstrates the level of skill in the art at the time of the invention. *See Okajima v. Bourdeau*, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that specific findings regarding ordinary skill level are not required “where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown” (quoting *Litton*

Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

C. *Asserted Grounds*

We next turn to the six grounds of invalidity asserted in the Petition: whether the subject matter of claims 1–5 of the '232 Patent would have been obviousness to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention over Rothman or Harris in view of Umaña (Grounds 1 and 2); Umaña and Malý (Grounds 3 and 4) or, in the case of claim 5 alone, Umaña and Gao (Grounds 5 and 6). Pet. 17.

Briefly, Petitioner contends that Rothman and Harris each suggest a link between removal of fucose and improved ADCC—and thus motivation to generate IgG-type antibodies cells lacking α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity—, whereas “*Umaña*, teaches the creation of mammalian host cells with modified sugar-adding genes (including ‘knock-outs’) to create sugar-modified antibodies with more efficient ADCC” properties.” Pet. 18–49. According to Petitioner, “[t]he necessary steps for creating such a host cell . . . were in the common knowledge.” *Id.* at 19 (citing Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 32–34, 39–42, 60–75). With respect to Grounds 3 and 4, Petitioner further argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been “emboldened . . . to pursue ‘knock-out’ of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase” by Malý’s “knockout of the gene for α (1,3)-fucosyltransferase in mouse embryos.” *Id.* at 32–47.¹³

Patent Owner responds that the challenged claims are not obvious because 1) neither Rothman nor Harris suggests a link between removal of

¹³ Petitioner further references Gao, in Grounds 5 and 6, merely to highlight the applicability of cell line YB2/0 for production of hybridomas. *Id.* at 47–50.

fucose and improved ADCC and, 2) none of the cited references disclose the “genomic gene encoding fucosyltransferase,” necessary for “deleting . . . or . . . adding a mutation to said genomic gene to eliminate the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase” to create the “isolated mammalian host cell which has no α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity” of independent claim 1. *See* Prelim. Resp. 22–50. We address these issues below.

i. Grounds 1, 3, and 5 (based on Rothman)

Petitioner relies on Rothman’s teachings regarding “a possible involvement of core fucosylation of IgG in NK cell-mediated ADCC,” and the reference’s conclusion that the “absence of core fucosylation itself would appear to be a likely candidate as a structural feature necessary for enhancement of NK cell-mediated ADCC,” as providing motivation to target the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase gene for genetic knockout. *See, e.g.*, Pet. 18–20. Patent Owner contends that Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Jefferis, fails to credit Rothman (or Harris) with discovering a correlation between defucosylation and enhanced ADCC in several review articles. Prelim. Resp. 48–50. Patent Owner further argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have read Rothman the way Petitioner urges based on a review article by Wright and Morrison (Ex. 2004) published before the earliest possible filing date of the ’232 Patent, which potentially contradicts a portion of Rothman’s analysis. *See id.* at 46–47.

We do not find Patent Owner’s position persuasive on the current record. Dr. Jefferis’s failure to mention Rothman in two review articles is insufficient to overcome Rothman’s express teaching that the “absence of core fucosylation itself would appear to be a likely candidate as a structural feature necessary for enhancement of NK cell-mediated ADCC.” *See*

Ex. 1002, 1122. And although we do not find Patent Owner's arguments based on Wright and Morrison unreasonable, Patent Owner's explanation of how one of ordinary skill in the art would interpret Rothman in view of this reference rests on attorney argument, which is entitled to little probative value. *See In re Geisler*, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, on the present record, Petitioner has shown sufficiently that Rothman provides a link between removal of fucose and improved ADCC and, thus, motivation to generate IgG-type antibodies in cells lacking α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity. This determination does not, however, end our inquiry with respect to Petitioner's assertion of obviousness.

ii. Grounds 2, 4, and 6 (based on Harris)

With respect to Grounds 2, 4, and 6, Petitioner relies on Harris to establish motivation to generate IgG-type antibodies in cells lacking α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity. In particular, Petitioner points to Harris's teaching that the fucose residue of an IgG-type antibody "may be of particular interest" because it is "near the Fc γ receptor binding site and could influence binding by the receptor." *See, e.g.*, Pet. 25–29 (quoting Ex. 1003, 1592) (emphasis removed); *see also* Ex. 1026 ¶¶ 71, 105 (asserting that Harris "describes the correlation between sugar chain modification—including the removal of fucose, particularly—and improved ADCC"); Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 83, 129 (same).

We do not find Petitioner's arguments persuasive. Although Harris draws attention to the proximity of the fucose moiety and the Fc γ receptor binding site, it merely hypothesizes that the fucose "could," therefore, "influence" Fc γ binding. *See* Ex. 1003, 1592. We do not read Harris as suggesting that any such potential influence would have a positive effect on

ADCC. To the contrary, Harris’s teaching that “[d]egradation or modification of the carbohydrate has . . . been clearly shown to eliminate or reduce effector functions such as . . . binding to Fc receptors,” suggests that any potential influence would more likely reduce, rather than enhance, ADCC. Ex. 1003, 1593–94. Moreover, as Patent Owner points out, “Harris does not mention removing fucose or improved ADCC, much less any causal relationship between the two. Rather, Harris suggests that the *presence* of fucose is required for receptor binding since fucose *interacts* with Tyr313 on the Fc region.” Prelim. Resp. 12.

For at least these reasons, the Petition fails to show sufficiently that the subject matter of claims 1–5 would have been obvious over Harris, in view of Umaña, Malý, and/or Gao. Accordingly, for at least these reasons, we decline to institute trial with respect to Grounds 2, 4, and 6.

iii. A gene encoding α 1,6-fucosyltransferase

Patent Owner contends that the Petition is defective with respect to all Grounds for “fail[ing] to identify a single reference in the alleged obviousness combinations that discloses the claimed genomic gene encoding α 1,6-fucosyltransferase, or any method of deleting or adding a mutation to the genomic gene encoding α 1,6-fucosyltransferase to eliminate α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity.” Prelim. Resp. 1–2. We agree with Patent Owner.

The claims of the ’232 Patent are directed to a “mammalian host cell which has no α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity.” *See* Ex. 1001, Title (“Antibody Composition-Producing Cell with Inactivated α 1,6-fucosyltransferase”). Citing paragraphs 39–41 of Dr. Van Ness’s Declaration, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he human fucosyltransferase gene

sequence was cloned in 1994.” Pet. 7 (emphasis added). Elaborating on Petitioner’s assertion, Dr. Van Ness testifies that “[t]he human fucosyltransferase gene sequence had been cloned in 1994 by Sasaki et al.(269(20) J. BIOL. CHEM. 14730–37 (1994)).” Ex. 1007 ¶ 40 (referencing Ex. 2009) (emphasis added); *see also id.* at ¶ 68 (referencing “the known genetic sequence of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase”). We do not find these statements supported by the present record.

First, in addition to the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase recited in independent claim 1, Malý discloses that there are *five* human fucosyltransferase genes encoding α 1,3-fucosyltransferases alone. Ex. 1005, 649. Further, Sasaki nowhere mentions α 1,6-fucosyltransferase, but instead discloses the cloning of Fuc-TVII, a member of “a unique class of the α 1,3-fucosyltransferase family.” Ex. 2009, 14730.

Petitioner presents no evidence suggesting that the nucleotide sequence of any α 1,3-fucosyltransferase is related to that of the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase recited in claim 1. Moreover, Petitioner does not even establish that any of the α 1,3-fucosyltransferases are involved in the fucosylation of antibodies. *See* Ex. 1038 98:17–20 (Dr. Van Ness admitting that he is “not aware” whether α 1,3-fucosyltransferases are involved in adding fucose to the complex sugar chain in antibodies); Prelim. Resp. 41–42.

Petitioner further contends that during prosecution, Patent Owner admitted “that the gene sequence for α (1,6)-fucosyltransferase had already been published.” Pet. 7 (citing Ex. 1036, Aug. 12, 2004 Amendment at 33–34). Agreeing that the genetic sequence of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase was “known,” Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Van Ness, further testifies that “a POSA

could have determined [the sequence of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase] independently and routinely.” Ex. 1007 ¶¶ 41, 68. Dr. Van Ness’s sole support for this position is that “during prosecution of the ’232 patent’s parent application, the patentee cited specific prior-art articles that confirm that sufficient information of the gene sequence for α 1,6-fucosyltransferase had already been published” (*id.* ¶ 40 (citing Ex. 1036, Aug. 12, 2004 Amendment at 33–34)). These assertions are not supported in the record before us.

According to the Specification, the inventors of the ’232 Patent cloned Exon 2 of the FUT 8 genomic sequence using a cDNA probe, and used that DNA to create a genomic knockout of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase in mammalian cells. *See* Ex. 1001, 98:22–110:25. In responding to a lack of enablement rejection under § 112, first paragraph, Applicants argued that “one of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to prepare a cell in which the enzyme activity of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase . . . is deleted or decreased without limitation to the exon 2.” Ex. 1036, Aug. 12, 2004 Amendment at 32–33. Applicants asserted that, “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would appreciate the intron and exon structures of . . . α 1,6-fucosyltransferase[] by using a method similar to the method described in Example 12 of the present specification, *if the cDNA of the target gene is known.*” *Id.* at 33–34 (emphasis added).

Thus, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, Applicants did not admit that the genetic sequence of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase was known, but that the intron/exon structure of the gene could be determined based upon knowledge of the FUT8 cDNA disclosed in Example 12 of their Specification. On the present record, Petitioner fails to establish that DNA

encoding any portion of the FUT8 DNA sequence was in the prior art. Because knowledge of at least some portion of this sequence is necessary for “deleting a genomic gene encoding α 1,6-fucosyltransferase or by adding a mutation to said genomic gene to eliminate the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity” as set forth in claim 1, we find unsupported Petitioner’s blanket assertions that “all limitations of claim 1 are taught by *Rothman* and *Umaña*,” and other combinations of asserted prior art. *See* Pet. 19, 26, 33, and 41.

With respect to his testimony that the Applicants “cited specific prior-art articles that confirm that sufficient information of the gene sequence for α 1,6-fucosyltransferase had already been published,” Dr. Van Ness relies on Applicants’ statement that:

In reference (i), the structure motif which is important to the activity of the fucosyltransferase was expected from fucosyltransferases derived from various species (see Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 6). In the reference (ii), the structure which is important to the activity of the fucosyltransferase was similarly expected (Fig. 3).

Ex. 1007 ¶ 40 (quoting Ex. 1036, Aug. 12, 2004 Amendment at 34). As we understand his testimony, Dr. Van Ness does not suggest that “reference (i)” or “reference (ii)” disclose any portion of the FUT8 DNA sequence, but that Applicants allegedly admitted that FUT8 DNA sequence could be derived from information about other fucosyltransferases contained in those references.

As an initial matter, we note that Applicants predicated the above statements regarding structures and structural motifs on the knowledge of cDNA for α 1,6-fucosyltransferase, which Petitioner does not establish as prior art. *See* Ex. 1036, Aug. 12, 2004 Amendment at 34 (stating “that the

relevant structures can be determined based on the cDNA”). *Id.* Moreover, the “structures” Applicants reference in the prosecution history are not DNA sequences but protein-based motifs; Dr. Van Ness does not establish that one of ordinary skill in the art could have derived any portion of the gene sequence for α 1,6-fucosyltransferase from protein-based “structures,” irrespective of whether they were important to the activity of fucosyltransferases generally. Because Dr. Van Ness cites no other evidence for the proposition that one of ordinary skill in the art would have “independently and routinely” determined the DNA sequence of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase, we accord his opinion little weight. *See* Ex. 1007 ¶ 41.

In sum, Petitioner argues that “[k]nowing [the DNA sequence of α 1,6-fucosyltransferase] . . . would have allowed a POSA to target [this gene] and disable it by using well known ‘knock-out’ techniques.” Pet. 7; Ex. 1007 ¶ 41 (same); *see also* Pet. 7–9, 13 (arguing that techniques for knocking out targeted genes were routine). But Petitioner fails to establish adequately that DNA encoding a mammalian α 1,6-fucosyltransferase was either available, or could be routinely obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art. Lacking sufficient evidence of access to that starting material, we agree with Patent Owner that the cited prior art fails to disclose or render obvious the “genomic gene encoding fucosyltransferase,” necessary for “deleting . . . or . . . adding a mutation to said genomic gene to eliminate the α 1,6-fucosyltransferase” in the “isolated mammalian host cell which has no α 1,6-fucosyltransferase activity” of independent claim 1. Prelim. Resp. 22–50. Thus, on the record before us, the Petition fails to show sufficiently that the subject matter of any challenged claim would have been obvious over the combined disclosures of Rothman, Harris, Umaña, Malý, and/or Gao.

Accordingly, we deny the Petition.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we determine that Petitioner has not shown there is a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail in proving the unpatentability of claims 1–5 of the '232 Patent.

IV. ORDER

In consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby:

ORDERED that Petitioner's request for *inter partes* review of claims 1–5 of the '232 Patent is denied and no *inter partes* review is instituted.

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