

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Celltrion, Inc.,
Petitioner,

v.

Biogen Inc.
Genentech, Inc.,
Patent Owners.

Case IPR2017-01227
Patent 7,682,612

PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. BACKGROUND	4
A. Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia.....	4
B. New Treatments For CLL	6
III. THE '612 PATENT IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE NOVEMBER 9, 1998 PRIORITY DATE.....	8
A. Petitioner Bears The Burden Of Persuading The Board That Any Challenged Claims Are Not Entitled To The Benefit Of The November 9, 1998 Priority Date	8
B. The '658 Provisional Application Discloses That The Inventor Had Possession Of The Methods Claimed.....	9
IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION	14
A. “chronic lymphocytic leukemia”	14
B. “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia”	18
1. Prosecution History Mandates Patent Owner’s Construction	20
2. Petitioner Misinterprets The Prosecution History	23
3. Reduction In Lymphocyte Count Does Not Amount To Effective Treatment	24
V. ALLEGED PRIOR ART	24
A. Petitioner Fails To Establish That Ex. 1107 (“FDA Transcript”) Is A Printed Publication	25
B. Petitioner Fails To Establish That Exhibit 1163 (“MD Anderson Print Newsletter”) and Exhibit 1103 (“MD Anderson Online Newsletter”) Are Printed Publications	29

	<u>Page</u>
1. Ex. 1163 (“MD Anderson Print Newsletter”).....	29
2. Ex. 1103 (“MD Anderson Online Newsletter”)	32
a) Petitioner Fails To Establish That The “Newsletter” Was Posted To The Internet On Or Before July 2, 1998	33
b) The Butler Affidavit Fails To Establish Even That The “Online Newsletter” Was Actually Available On The Internet On February 8, 1999	36
c) Petitioner Has Not Established That The “Online Newsletter” Was Searchable Or Discoverable	36
 VI. NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE ’612 PATENT ARE UNPATENTABLE.....	 38
A. Ground 1: The Claims Are Not Obvious Over Czuczman, The “FDA Transcript,” Batata, and Maloney.....	38
1. Petitioner Fails To Establish That The “FDA Transcript” Was A Prior Art Printed Publication (All Challenged Claims).....	38
2. None Of Czuczman, The “FDA Transcript,” Batata, Or Maloney Discloses Effectively Treating CLL Patients By Administering An Anti-CD20 Antibody (All Challenged Claims)	39
a) The “FDA Transcript” And Czuczman Did Not Report Clinically Meaningful Results for Administering Rituximab To IWF Type A NHL.....	39
i. The “FDA Transcript”	39
ii. Czuczman	42
b) IWF Type A Patients Disclosed In The “FDA Transcript” And Czuczman Were Not CLL Patients ..	43

	<u>Page</u>
3.	Petitioner Fails To Establish A Motivation To Combine Czuczman, The “FDA Transcript,” Batata, And Maloney..... 46
a)	No Motivation To Treat CLL (All Challenged Claims)..... 46
b)	No Motivation To Combine With Chemotherapy (All Challenged Claims)..... 49
c)	No Motivation To Increase Dose (Claims 28 and 29). 50
d)	No Motivation To Administer Biweekly Or Monthly (Claims 41 and 42) 51
4.	Petitioner Fails To Establish A Reasonable Expectation Of Success In Effectively Treating CLL (All Challenged Claims) 55
B.	Ground 2: The Claims Are Not Obvious Over Byrd And The “Newsletters”..... 56
1.	Petitioner Fails To Establish That Any “MD Anderson Newsletters” Was A Prior Art Printed Publication (All Challenged Claims)..... 57
2.	Petitioner Fails To Establish A Motivation To Combine The “Newsletters” And Byrd 57
a)	No Motivation to Combine With Chemotherapy (All Challenged Claims)..... 57
b)	No Motivation To Increase Dose (Claims 28 and 29). 58
c)	No Motivation To Administer Biweekly Or Monthly (Claims 41 and 42) 59
3.	Petitioner Fails To Establish A Reasonable Expectation Of Success In Effectively Treating CLL (All Challenged Claims) 60

	<u>Page</u>
i. The Existence Of A Reasonable Expectation Of Success Cannot Be Assumed Based On The Initiation Of A Clinical Trial.....	60
ii. Jensen Taught That Administration Of Anti-CD20 Antibody Is Not Effective To Treat CLL	61
C. Ground 3: Claims 41 and 42 Are Not Obvious Over Byrd, The “Newsletters,” and Kipps	62
VII. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF <i>INTER PARTES</i> REVIEW	63
VIII. CONCLUSION.....	63

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page(s)
Cases	
<i>All Dental Prodx v. Advantage Dental Prods.</i> , 309 F.3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002)	11
<i>In re Aller</i> , 220 F.2d 454 (C.C.P.A. 1955)	54
<i>In re Antonie</i> , 559 F.2d 518 (C.C.P.A. 1977)	54
<i>Apple Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG</i> , IPR2016-01844 (Paper 10) (Mar. 10, 2017).....	11
<i>Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.</i> , 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)	10, 11, 14
<i>Biogen Idec, Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline LLC</i> , No. 10-CV-00608-BEN (BGS), 2011 WL 4949042 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011)	19, 20, 24
<i>BLD Services, LLC v. LMK Technologies.</i> , IPR2014-00770 (Paper 40) (Nov. 18, 2015)	36, 37
<i>Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH, et al., v. Biogen Inc.</i> , IPR2015-00418 (Paper 14) (July 13, 2015).....	31, 49
<i>Capon v. Eshhar</i> , 418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)	11
<i>Cisco Sys. v. Constellation Techs.</i> , IPR2014-00871 (Paper 12) (Dec. 19, 2012).....	39
<i>Cisco Sys. v. Constellation Techs.</i> , IPR2014-01085 (Paper 11) (Jan. 9, 2015).....	58
<i>Coalition for Affordable Drugs VIII, LLC v. Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania</i> , IPR2015-01835 (Paper 56) (Mar. 6, 2017).....	39

	<u>Page(s)</u>
<i>In re Cronyn</i> , 890 F.2d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1989)	27, 29
<i>In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.</i> , 676 F.3d 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2012)	47
<i>D’Agostino v. MasterCard Int’l Inc.</i> , 844 F.3d 945 (Fed. Cir. 2016)	20
<i>Eiselstein v. Frank</i> , 52 F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1995)	11
<i>Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.</i> , 619 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010)	62
<i>In re Fay</i> , 347 F.2d 597 (C.C.P.A. 1965)	54
<i>Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., LTD.</i> , 535 U.S. 722 (2002).....	21, 22
<i>Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso LLC</i> , CBM2013-00044, 2014 WL 7273564 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2014)	29, 38
<i>HTC Corporation, et al. v. Advanced Audio Devices, LLC</i> , IPR2014-01158 (Paper 36) (Jan. 22, 2016)	9
<i>Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.</i> , 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986)	10
<i>I-Blason LLC v. Aevoe Corp.</i> , IPR2016-00231 (Paper 9) (July 25, 2016).....	35
<i>Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc.</i> , 805 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015)	11
<i>In re Lister</i> , 583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009)	28
<i>In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.</i> , 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016)	8

	<u>Page(s)</u>
<i>McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co.</i> , 169 U.S. 606 (1898).....	64
<i>Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc.</i> , 874 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1989)	55
<i>Microsoft Corp. v. Bradium Techs, LLC</i> , IPR2015-01435 (Paper 15) (Dec. 23, 2015).....	39
<i>Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.</i> , 363 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004)	31
<i>Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC</i> , 639 F. App’x 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016)	64
<i>Phillips v. AWH Corp.</i> , 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)	15
<i>Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Rembrandt Wireless Technology</i> , IPR2014-00514 (Paper 18) (Sept. 9, 2014)	28
<i>SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.</i> , 511 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2008)	26, 29, 34, 49
<i>St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Access Closure, Inc.</i> , 729 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013)	55
<i>Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia Inc.</i> , 437 F. App’x 897 (Fed. Cir. 2011)	36, 37
<i>Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.</i> , 665 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2012)	10
<i>Tas v. Beachy</i> , 626 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2015)	14
<i>Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.</i> , 545 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008)	9
<i>In re Yates</i> , 663 F.2d 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1981).....	54

Page(s)

Statutes

35 U.S.C. § 102(b)26
35 U.S.C. § 311(b)25

I. INTRODUCTION

Claims 23-35 and 37-57 of U.S. Patent No. 7,682,612 (the “612 patent”) describe methods of treating chronic lymphocytic leukemia (“CLL”) by administering an anti-CD20 antibody combined with chemotherapy. Ex. 1101, 8:58-10:51. Petitioner challenges these claims on three grounds. The Board should deny institution because, *inter alia*, Petitioner fails to establish that at least one document in each of the three grounds is a printed publication on which *inter partes* review may be based.

Ground 1 is based on Exhibit 1107, which Petitioner refers to as the “FDA Transcript” or the “Transcript.” Petitioner offers no evidence—and does not attempt to argue—that Exhibit 1107 was ever actually disseminated before the priority date. Rather, based on an unsworn letter from someone who does not even profess to have personal knowledge of Exhibit 1107 before the priority date, Petitioner merely speculates that Exhibit 1107 “would have” been received by a reading room before the priority date and the public could then have requested a copy. Moreover, Petitioner does not even assert, let alone offer evidence, that the “Transcript” also would have been catalogued or indexed such that a POSA exercising reasonable diligence could have located it in any such reading room. Accordingly, Petitioner never establishes that Exhibit 1107 is a printed publication and Ground 1 fails.

Grounds 2 and 3 are based on Exhibit 1163 and Exhibit 1103, which Petitioner refer to as the “MD Anderson Online Newsletter” and “MD Anderson Print Newsletter,” or generally the “Newsletter.” Petitioner offers no firsthand testimony regarding the alleged public accessibility of either document. And, the secondhand testimony offered by Petitioner shows, if anything, that at least one of the documents (Ex. 1163) was *never* publicly accessible. As for the other document (Ex. 1103), Petitioner merely argues that it is prior art based on a date it supposedly was “last modified.” Even assuming the document was in fact “last modified” on that date, it would not follow that the document also was publicly accessible as of that date. Petitioner is therefore unable to establish that Exhibit 1163 and Exhibit 1103 are printed publications and Grounds 2 and 3 fail.

All three grounds would fail even if they were based on prior art printed publications. Even if the “Transcript” were a printed publication, Ground 1 would still fail, for example, because Petitioner fails to show that the “Transcript,” or any other document of the ground, discloses administration of an anti-CD20 antibody to CLL patients, as claimed (as opposed to lymphoma patients, which are different). Moreover, Petitioner’s motivation-to-combine arguments are based on erroneous characterizations of the teachings of the “Transcript” and ignore that the only reference of record that reported any results from actually administering rituximab to CLL patients—Jensen (Ex. 1138)—would have discouraged a POSA

from such methods, and would have foreclosed any reasonable expectation of success, because it reported that administration of four weekly doses of 375 mg/m² rituximab resulted in a treatment failure accompanied by severe, potentially life-threatening side effects, and warned that the 375 mg/m² dose “might be too high” for CLL patients. Ex. 1138, 004. A POSA would have been even more discouraged from practicing the methods of dependent claims 28 and 29, which require a dose even *higher* (at least 500 mg/m²) than the dose reported as hazardous in Jensen, and the methods of claims 41 and 42, which require even less frequent dosing (biweekly or monthly) than the ineffective schedule of Jensen. The petition nowhere addresses Jensen.

For the same reasons, Grounds 2 and 3 would fail even if Petitioner had established that the “Newsletters” were prior art printed publications. Petitioner fails to establish that as of the priority date, a POSA would have had a reason to combine the documents of these grounds to arrive at the claimed method of treating CLL, and would have had a reasonable expectation of success in doing so—particularly in view of Jensen.

For these reasons, and as explained in detail below, the Board should deny institution on all grounds.

II. BACKGROUND

The '612 patent issued from an application filed on November 9, 1999, and claims priority to U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/107,658 (the "'658 provisional application"), filed on November 9, 1998. Ex. 1101, 001.

A. Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia

Chronic lymphocytic leukemia ("CLL") as its name implies, belongs to a group of cancers called "leukemias." Ex. 2001, 003. Generally, leukemia is a "[c]ancer that starts in blood-forming tissue, such as the bone marrow, and causes large numbers of abnormal [i.e., cancerous] blood cells to be produced and enter the bloodstream." Ex. 2008, 001.

In CLL, the cancerous cell is a type of white blood cell known as a "B lymphocyte." Ex. 2001, 003. Cancerous B lymphocytes proliferate and accumulate in the blood, leading to levels that are much higher than those found in healthy people. *Id.* A healthy person generally has no greater than 4,500 circulating lymphocytes per microliter of blood ("4,500 lymphocytes/ μ L"). *Id.* at 004. A CLL patient typically has a much greater number—and therefore is said to have "lymphocytosis." *Id.* "[I]n most patients, the absolute lymphocytosis exceeds

15 x 10⁹/L,” *id.*, which is equivalent to 15,000 lymphocytes/μL.¹ As set forth in the National Cancer Institute-Sponsored Working Group Guidelines for CLL (the “NCI Guidelines”), at least 5,000 lymphocytes/μL is considered the *minimum* lymphocyte count for a CLL diagnosis. Ex. 1122, 003.

Although their acronyms may appear similar, CLL and SLL are distinct diseases. Unlike CLL, which is a leukemia, SLL, which stands for “Small Lymphocytic Lymphoma,” belongs to a group of cancers called lymphomas. Specifically, it is one of the non-Hodgkin’s lymphomas (“NHL”). Ex. 1118, 012.

A *key* differentiator between CLL and SLL is the level of circulating lymphocytes in afflicted patients, as reflected by lymphocyte count. “The clinical diagnosis of CLL *requires* an absolute lymphocytosis [elevated lymphocyte count] with a lower threshold of greater than 5,000 mature-appearing lymphocytes/μL in the peripheral blood, in part to separate CLL from small lymphocytic non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.” Ex. 1122, 003 (emphasis added); *see also* Ex. 1136, ¶ 22 (citing Ex. 1122, 003).

Petitioner cites to lymphoma classifications, namely the National Cancer Institute’s Working Formulation (“IWF”) and Revised European and American

¹ Because there are one million (1 x 10⁶) microliters (μL) in one liter (L), 1 x 10⁹/L equals 1000/μL.

Lymphoma (“REAL”) Classification, as allegedly equating CLL and SLL. Pet. 8-9. But IWF and REAL do not equate CLL and SLL. They simply describe SLL as “consistent with”—not identical to—CLL, and they describe SLL as a *lymphoma* type “B-CLL/SLL.” Ex. 1119, 006 (emphasis added); *see also id.* at 007; Ex. 1118, 012, 014.² Further, unlike the NCI Guidelines for CLL, Petitioner’s classifications merely address cellular morphology; they do not define what CLL is as a disease and how to differentiate it from other B cell diseases.³

B. New Treatments For CLL

Although CLL is characterized by high circulating lymphocyte counts at the time of diagnosis, mere reduction in lymphocyte count is not sufficient to effectively treat CLL. Ex. 1122, 004. Instead, the goal of treating CLL is, and has been, to provide a positive clinical benefit to the patient, including addressing the patient’s outward symptoms (such as fatigue and fever), the size of the patient’s

² The “classification proposed by Hiddemann,” Pet. 35, is “a clinical grouping” of the REAL *lymphoma* classifications. Ex. 1120, 006.

³ Petitioner cites Harris, published in December 1999 (Ex. 1112), and a patent application filed in 2009 (Ex. 1139), as supporting the alleged equivalence of CLL and SLL. Pet. 41. But both post-date the priority date of the ’612 patent.

lymph nodes and spleen/liver, and the patient's blood count (red blood cells and platelets). *Id.*; *see also* Ex. 1155, 034.

While there were no proven cures for CLL in the 1990s, splenectomy, radiation therapy, marrow and blood stem transplantation, and various chemotherapies were used to treat CLL with limited success. Ex. 1155, 033-036.

The inventors of the '612 patent conceived of new treatments for CLL using anti-CD20 antibodies, including an antibody called "rituximab." Ex. 1101, 1:41-45. As set forth in the prosecution history, on August 15, 1995, '612 patent inventor Dr. Susan Desmond-Hellman emailed inventor Dr. Antonio Grillo-Lopez regarding a "CLL study synopsis" that was the product of a meeting held the same day. Ex. 1104, 735. The CLL study synopsis proposed treating CLL with rituximab (also known as "C2B8") at dose levels of "150, 375, and 500" mg/m² and listed MD Anderson as a "Site[]" for conducting a study. *Id.* at 735.⁴

A CLL study arising from this synopsis was subsequently conducted by an external investigator, Dr. Susan O'Brien of the MD Anderson Cancer Center, under contract with Patent Owner.

⁴ Petitioner acknowledges that this 1995 email suggested the use of 500 mg/m² of rituximab to treat CLL. Pet. 18-19.

III. THE '612 PATENT IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE NOVEMBER 9, 1998 PRIORITY DATE

The '612 patent invokes priority to the '658 provisional application, filed on November 9, 1998. Petitioner does not contest the chain of priority. Rather, Petitioner argues that the challenged claims are not entitled to the November 9, 1998 filing date on the ground that “the '658 provisional application lacks legally sufficient written description or enablement support for these claims.” Pet. 20. Petitioner fails to carry its burden of proof on this issue.

A. Petitioner Bears The Burden Of Persuading The Board That Any Challenged Claims Are Not Entitled To The Benefit Of The November 9, 1998 Priority Date

Petitioner misstates the law when it asserts that “Patent Owners have the burden of demonstrating that” the '612 patent is entitled to its priority date. Pet. 19.

A patent owner is not burdened with persuading the Board that a patent is entitled to priority. At most, a patent owner bears a burden of production on the issue of priority. *In re Magnum Oil Tools Int'l, Ltd.*, 829 F.3d 1364, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (resolving “parties’ arguments about the distinct burden of production”). If a Petitioner “has introduced sufficient evidence to put at issue whether there is prior art alleged to anticipate the claims being asserted,” a patent owner bears the burden of “going forward with evidence either that the prior art does not actually anticipate” and/or “that it is not prior art because the asserted claim is entitled to

the benefit of a filing date prior to the alleged prior art.” *Technology Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.*, 545 F.3d 1316, 1327, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

It remains the petitioner’s burden, however, to convince the Board that patent owner “is *not* entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing date.” *Id.* at 1328 (emphasis added); *HTC Corporation, et al. v. Advanced Audio Devices, LLC*, IPR2014-01158 (Paper 36) at 10 (Jan. 22, 2016) (emphasizing that “the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the Petitioner, who must “convince the Board that the challenged claim is not entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing date”).

B. The ’658 Provisional Application Discloses That The Inventor Had Possession Of The Methods Claimed

Petitioner argues that the challenged claims are not entitled to the benefit of the November 9, 1998 filing date because they allegedly “lack written description or enablement support” in the ’658 provisional application. Pet. 20.

As an initial matter, although Petitioner asserts that these claims “lack legally sufficient written description *or* enablement support,” *id.* (emphasis added), Petitioner does not offer evidence to support a conclusion that the claims are not enabled. Petitioner’s expert does not even articulate the enablement standard, much less purport to apply it. Ex. 1105, ¶¶58-59. Furthermore, Petitioner’s assertions that “[t]here is not a single example, reference study[,], or any demonstrated results indicating that the inventors . . . taught a POSA how to practice the full scope of the these combination therapy claims” are conclusory and misguided. Pet. 20. “[A]

patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.” *Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986); *Streck, Inc. v. Research & Diagnostic Sys.*, 665 F.3d 1269, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“It is well established, however, that a specification need not disclose what is well-known in the art.”). Petitioner fails to identify anything within the scope of the combination therapy claims that a POSA allegedly would not have been able to practice based on the disclosure of the application together with what was known in the art. Because Petitioner instead focuses on written-description arguments, so too does Patent Owner.

Under § 112, ¶1, “the test for [written description] sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” *Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “[T]he test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.” *Id.* “The descriptive text needed to meet these requirements varies with the nature and scope of the invention at issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in existence.” *Capon v. Eshhar*, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

“[T]he written description requirement does not demand either examples or an actual reduction to practice,” and it “does not demand any particular form of

disclosure, or that the specification recite the claimed invention *in haec verba*.” *Ariad*, 598 F.3d at 1352; *Apple Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG*, IPR2016-01844 (Paper 10) at 16-17 (Mar. 10, 2017). “[T]he specification ‘need not describe the claimed subject matter in exactly the same terms as used in the claims’” *All Dental Prodx v. Advantage Dental Prods.*, 309 F.3d 774, 779 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting *Eiselstein v. Frank*, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038-39 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[Even] the failure of the specification to specifically mention a limitation that later appears in the claims is not a fatal one when one skilled in the art would recognize upon reading the specification that the new language reflects what the specification shows has been invented.” *Id.* at 779.

The written description requirement is satisfied “when ‘the essence of the original disclosure’ conveys the necessary information—‘regardless of *how* it’ conveys such information.” *Inphi Corp. v. Netlist, Inc.*, 805 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).

The ’658 provisional application states that “[t]reatment of hematologic malignancy, such as CLL, . . . according to the invention will comprise the administration of a therapeutically effective amount of an anti-CD20 antibody, which administration may be effected alone or in conjunction with other treatment(s), e.g., chemotherapy” Ex. 1102, 006; *id.* at 009 (describing treatment with an anti-CD20 antibody and stating that “it may be desirable to

combine such administration with other treatments, e.g., radioactive therapy, both targeted and non-targeted, chemotherapies, . . . etc.”). The application discloses that for the anti-CD20 antibody, “[t]ypically effective dosages will range from about 0.001 to about 30 mg/kg body weight, more preferably from about 0.01 to 25 mg/kg body weight, and most preferably from about 0.1 to about 20 mg/kg body weight.” *Id.* at 009. The application specifically identifies “one such therapeutic anti-CD20 antibody, Rituxan[®] [rituximab⁵],” *id.* at 004, and discloses administering unlabeled Rituxan[®] in dosages of 375 mg/m² and 500-1500 mg/m². *Id.* at 014-015.

Thus, the ’658 provisional application discloses the limitations of independent claim 23, which is “[a] method of treating chronic lymphocytic leukemia in a human patient, comprising administering an anti-CD20 antibody to the patient in an amount effective to treat chronic lymphocytic leukemia, wherein the anti-CD20 antibody therapy is combined with chemotherapy, wherein the method does not include treatment with a radiolabeled anti-CD20 antibody,” and the limitations of independent claim 28, which adds that the “anti-CD20 antibody is administered to the patient at a dosage of about 500 to about 1500 mg/m².”

⁵ Rituximab is the international nonproprietary name (INN) for the anti-CD20 antibody sold by Patent Owners under the trademark Rituxan[®].

According to the application, “[a] particularly preferred chemotherapeutic regimen that may be used in conjunction with the subject antibody immunotherapy comprises CHOP immunotherapy, which comprises the administration of a combination of cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, vincristine and prednisone,” but the application also discloses that “[o]ther known chemotherapeutics include methotrexate, cisplatin, toremifene and tamoxifen.” Ex. 1102, 010. Accordingly, dependent claims 47-52 and 54-57 also find express written-description support in the ’658 provisional application. Petitioner does not contend otherwise. Nor does Petitioner contend that claims 24-27 and 29-45 lack such written-description support—and for good reason. *See* Ex. 1102, 009 (supporting claims 24-26); *id.* at 014 (supporting claims 27 and 29); *id.* at 014-15 (supporting claims 30-32); *id.* at 006 (supporting claims 33, 35, and 37); *id.* at 005 (supporting claim 34); *id.* at 009 (supporting claims 38-39 and 41-42); *id.* at 009 (supporting claim 40); *id.* at 008-009 (supporting claims 43-44); *id.* at 006 (supporting claim 45).

Petitioner argues that claims 46 and 53 lack express written-description support in the ’658 provisional application, but Patent Owner need not address those arguments because Petitioner is contesting the patentability of those claims based solely on documents that it alleges were prior art before the ’658 provisional application was filed.

Petitioner argues that “[t]here is not a single example, reference study or any demonstrated results indicating that the inventors had possession of and taught a POSA how to practice the full scope of these combination therapy claims.” Pet. 20. But no such disclosures are needed to satisfy the written description requirement, as noted above. *Ariad*, 598 F.3d at 1352 (explaining that “the written description requirement does not demand either examples or an actual reduction to practice”); *Tas v. Beachy*, 626 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2015), *cert. denied*, 136 S. Ct. 1681 (2016), (“The PTAB correctly stated that the written description and enablement requirements do not demand as a matter of law actual examples or an actual reduction to practice.”).

IV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

A. “chronic lymphocytic leukemia”

The claim term “chronic lymphocytic leukemia” should be construed to mean “a B-cell cancer characterized in part by a threshold of greater than at least 5,000 lymphocytes/ μ L in the peripheral blood at diagnosis.”

As discussed in Section II.A, the lower threshold for diagnosis of CLL as of the priority date was at least 5,000 lymphocytes/ μ L. Ex. 1122, 003 (“The clinical diagnosis of CLL *requires* an absolute lymphocytosis with a lower threshold of greater than 5,000 mature-appearing lymphocytes/ μ L in the peripheral blood, in

part to separate CLL from small lymphocytic non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.”) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the threshold of at least 5,000 lymphocytes/ μL is part of the intrinsic record. For example, during prosecution, Patent Owner's expert explained that “[t]he clinical diagnosis of CLL requires an absolute lymphocytosis with a lower threshold of $>5 \times 10^9$ mature appearing lymphocytes per liter of peripheral blood [(5,000 lymphocytes/ μL)].” Ex. 1136, 006 (citing Ex. 1122, 003). Patent Owner's expert also explained that “[t]his diagnostic criterion serves in part to distinguish CLL from small lymphocytic lymphoma (SLL).” *Id.*

The $\geq 5,000$ lymphocytes/ μL threshold also appears in the '612 patent's “References Cited,” which constitute intrinsic evidence. *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). For example, McLaughlin (Ex. 1116), which was cited during prosecution, Ex. 1101, 002, notes that “[p]atients with chronic lymphocytic leukemia,” defined as patients with “lymphocytes $> 5 \times 10^9/\text{L}$ ” ($>5,000$ lymphocytes/ μL), “were excluded” from the reported study. Ex. 1116, 004. The same threshold also was applied by inventors Drs. Grillo-Lopez and White in a study reported in a 1997 paper. Ex. 1115, 008 (“[P]atients with chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) were excluded from this trial (based on the presence of $>5,000$ lymphocytes/ μL for this histologic subgroup).”).

Petitioner's proposed construction reduces the minimum threshold from 5,000 lymphocytes/ μ L to 4,000 white blood cells/ μ L. Not only are these numerical differences significant, but the difference between "white blood cells" and lymphocytes is also significant. As Petitioner's expert explains, "[w]hite blood cells (also known as leukocytes) include" not only lymphocytes, but also "neutrophils, basophils, eosinophils, monocytes, and macrophages." Ex. 1105, 038 n.5. "Thus, [Petitioner's] threshold based on a white cell count of 4,000 cells/ μ L . . . corresponds to fewer than 4,000 lymphocytes/ μ L when based on lymphocyte count." *Id.* (emphasis omitted).

Petitioner tries to support its reduced threshold with reference to Example 3 of the '612 patent and the Batata and Kipps references. Pet. 22-23. But none of these materials supports Petitioner's positions:

Petitioner states that "[i]n Example 3 of the patent, CLL patients are identified as having '[m]edian white blood cell count [of] $40 \times 10^9/L$ (range, 4-200).'" Pet. 22 (quoting Ex. 1101, 6:12-13). But that data is for previously diagnosed and treated CLL patients having lymphocyte counts subject to depletion by prior therapies. Ex. 1101, 6:15-16 ("Median numbers of prior therapies was 2.5 (range 1-9)."). Such data therefore does not set forth any threshold for diagnosing CLL in the first instance. Nowhere does Example 3 describe any of these CLL patients as newly-diagnosed based on any of the reported median white blood cell

counts. The $>5,000$ lymphocytes/ μL requirement is a threshold applied “at diagnosis,” as specified in Patent Owner’s construction, not a criterion applied dynamically to determine whether a previously-diagnosed CLL patient is somehow deemed to have CLL on any given day.

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, Batata and Kipps do not offer “various thresholds” for diagnosing CLL and do not support a “ $>4,000$ lymphocytes/ μL ” threshold either. Pet. 22. Even if they did support a $4,000$ *lymphocyte*/ μL threshold, that is different from the $4,000$ *white blood cell*/ μL threshold that Petitioner advances, as discussed above.

Batata describes a study in which “CLL was diagnosed according to the criteria established by the International Workshop on Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia,” as set forth in two papers. Ex. 1108, 003 (citing Ex. 2002 and Ex. 2003). One of the cited papers states that “[d]efining criteria using the current staging systems for the disease suggest that a persistent lymphocytosis of $>10 \times 10^9/\text{l}$ [$10,000/\mu\text{L}$] is sufficient for a diagnosis of CLL,” as is “lymphocytosis between 5 and $10 \times 10^9/\text{l}$ [$5,000\text{-}10,000/\mu\text{L}$] [with supporting] cell marker studies.” Ex. 2002, 005. The other paper states that “[l]ymphocyte counts in the blood are usually equal to or higher than $10 \times 10^9/\text{L}$ [$10,000/\mu\text{L}$]” in CLL patients. Ex. 2003, 001. Thus, neither of these papers supports Petitioner’s “ $>4,000$ white blood cells/ μL ” construction.

Kipps states that “CLL invariably is associated with a blood *lymphocytosis* [$>4,000$ lymphocytes/ μL (4×10^9 /liter)] whereas small lymphocytic lymphoma invariably is associated with lymph node involvement.” Ex. 1155, 030 (brackets in original, emphasis added). This recitation of “ >4000 lymphocytes/ μL ” is a definition of “lymphocytosis,” not a definition of CLL. Elsewhere, Kipps describes $>5,000/\mu\text{L}$ as the level of lymphocytosis that is required for a CLL diagnosis: “The diagnosis of CLL *requires* a sustained monoclonal lymphocytosis greater than $5,000/\mu\text{L}$.” *Id.* at 028 (emphasis added). In fact, Kipps adds, “[a]t diagnosis the absolute lymphocyte count generally exceeds $10,000/\mu\text{L}$. . . and is sometimes greater than $100,000/\mu\text{L}$.” *Id.*

The Board should reject Petitioner’s proposed construction and should construe “chronic lymphocytic leukemia” to mean “a B-cell cancer characterized in part by a threshold of greater than at least $5,000$ lymphocytes/ μL in the peripheral blood at diagnosis.”

B. “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia”

The Board should construe the phrase “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia” to mean “providing a positive clinical benefit to the chronic lymphocytic leukemia patient.”

A United States District Court previously construed “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia” this way in litigation involving the ’612 patent.

Biogen Idec, Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline LLC, No. 10-CV-00608-BEN (BGS), 2011 WL 4949042, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011). In fact, the court addressed, and resolved, the exact issue facing the Board here, as explained in the opinion: “The parties agree that ‘effective to treat [CLL]’ includes the amount of [rituximab] that achieves a reduction in circulating tumor cells; the issue is whether a patient *must also* reach a positive clinical benefit in order for the treatment to be effective.” *Id.* at *3 (emphasis in original).

Petitioner acknowledges the district court’s construction, but argues that the Board should disregard it because the court was “[a]pplying a different claim construction standard.” Pet. 23 n.8. The court’s construction was dictated by the prosecution history, however, and is accordingly the “broadest reasonable construction”:

The protocol of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation. Instead, claims should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying patent; the Board should also consult the patent’s prosecution history in proceedings in which the patent has been brought back to the agency for a second review.

D’Agostino v. MasterCard Int’l Inc., 844 F.3d 945, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

1. Prosecution History Mandates Patent Owner's Construction

The parties agree that the construction of “effective to treat [CLL]” should be based on the prosecution history. The parties disagree as to which construction the prosecution history mandates.

As explained below, the term “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia” was added to the claims during prosecution to replace the phrase “effective to achieve a reduction in circulating tumor cells.”

Original claim 1 was directed to a “method of treating hematologic malignancy associated with high numbers of circulating tumor cells by administering a therapeutically effective amount of an anti-CD20 antibody or antigen-binding fragment thereof, said amount being effective to achieve a reduction in circulating tumor cells.” Ex. 2004, 002. In response to a rejection by the examiner, these claims were cancelled and replaced with claims specifically requiring the amount administered to be “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia.” Ex. 2005, 003-010. The applicants explained that these new claims were specifically directed to a different goal: “The new claims also differ from the claims they replace in that the amount of anti-CD20 antibody administered to the patient is required to be ‘effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia,’ instead of ‘effective to achieve a reduction in circulating tumor cells.’” *Id.* at 015.

“Claims are interpreted by reference to those that have been cancelled or rejected.” *Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., LTD.*, 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002). “[B]y the amendment [the patentee] recognized and emphasized the difference between the two phrases”—“effective to achieve a reduction in circulating tumor cells” and “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia”—and elected the latter over the former. *Id.* “The difference which [the patentee] thus disclaimed must be regarded as material.” *Id.* Thus, “effective to treat the [CLL]” cannot mean “effective to achieve a reduction in circulating tumor cells.”

In a 2009 response to the PTO, the applicants further explained that “effective treatment of CLL must result in a *positive clinical benefit* to the CLL patient. . . . *[T]he claims do require a specific, positive therapeutic outcome, and not simply induction of any type of response in the patient.*” Ex 1104, 648 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Along with this response, the applicants provided a declaration from Dr. Schenkein, a practicing hematologist/oncologist at the time of the invention. Dr. Schenkein’s declaration explained that ““an amount effective to treat the CLL’ . . . must result in a positive clinical benefit to the CLL patient.” *Id.* at 541 (emphasis omitted). For example, treatments that “demonstrated efficacy with minimal infusion related toxicity, . . . overall response rate (ORR), complete responses (CR), partial

responses (PR), improved median time to progression or improved duration of response, . . . or remission upon treatment.” *Id.* at 541-42.

The applicants also distinguished the claimed “effective[ness]” from the ineffective treatment described by Jensen (Ex. 1138). Ex. 1104, 540-541. Jensen is a “Rapid Communication” published in July/August 1998 reporting that the administration of 375 mg/m² rituximab to a CLL patient results in “severe side effects,” which the authors attributed to “rapid tumor lysis.” Ex. 1138, 003-004. Three subsequent, weekly infusions were administered “without clinical problems,” but, despite the initial normalization of the circulating lymphocyte count, the patient had progressive disease. *Id.* at 004. Progressive disease is considered “treatment failure.” Ex. 1122, 008. Jensen warns that “[p]hysicians must be aware of this hitherto unreported phenomenon in patients with high CD20-positive blood counts.” *Id.* at 003. Similarly disappointing results were reported for an additional six patients. *Id.* at 004. Serious side effects (“acute tumor lysis and NCI grade III and IV toxicities”) were reported for five patients with high lymphocyte counts and no positive clinical efficacy data was reported for any of the six additional patients. *Id.* As the applicant explained, “the requirements of the claims are not met by Jensen, as by no measure can an undesirable and life-threatening condition in the CLL patient, coupled with a continued progression of

the CLL disease be considered an effective treatment of CLL.” Ex. 1104, 648 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Petitioner Misinterprets The Prosecution History

Petitioner argues that “effective to treat the [chronic lymphocytic leukemia]” means “a therapeutic response such as a reduction in the number of the small lymphocytic tumor cells.” Pet. 23 (citing Andreeff Decl., Ex. 1105, ¶¶52-53). Petitioner premises its construction on a single statement made during prosecution: “One of skill in the art of clinical oncology would understand that effective treatments of CLL include, but are not necessarily limited to, those assessed with respect to a reduction in circulating tumor cells.” Pet. 23 (quoting Ex. 1104, 256) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner ignores the context of this statement, which was made in the same amendment where the applicants explicitly told the PTO that the new claims were directed to a different goal than just “achiev[ing] a reduction in circulating tumor cells.” Ex. 2005, 015. As the court in the earlier litigation observed, “[t]his statement does not contradict Plaintiffs’ construction.” *Biogen*, 2011 WL 4949042, at *5, n.6.

The statement that Petitioner relies upon simply asserts that effective treatments *include* “those assessed with respect to a reduction in circulating tumor cells.” Ex. 2005, 015. In other words, while reduction in circulating tumor cells can be *included* as part of the assessment of therapeutic effectiveness, this alone is

insufficient to show that a treatment is effective to treat CLL. *Id.* This in no way defines an effective treatment as any treatment that reduces circulating tumor cells only.

3. **Reduction In Lymphocyte Count Does Not Amount To Effective Treatment**

As explained above, as of the priority date, a POSA would have known that the goal of treating CLL was to provide a positive clinical benefit to the patient, including addressing the patient's outward symptoms (such as fatigue and fever), the size of the patient's lymph nodes and spleen/liver, and the patient's blood count (red blood cells and platelets). Ex. 1122, 004.⁶ The NCI Guidelines specifically warned against using the absolute lymphocyte count as the sole indicator for treatment: "Therefore, the absolute lymphocyte count should not be used as the sole indicator for treatment, but should be included as part of the total clinical picture, which includes the lymphocyte doubling time" Ex. 1122, 007.

V. **ALLEGED PRIOR ART**

A patent claim can be challenged in *inter partes* review "only on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications." 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). "[P]ublic accessibility' has been called the touchstone in determining whether a

⁶ As discussed in Section IV.A, the NCI Guidelines are part of the intrinsic record.

reference constitutes a ‘printed publication’ bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” *SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.*, 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “A given reference is ‘publicly accessible’ upon a satisfactory showing that such document has been disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art[,] exercising reasonable diligence, can locate it.” *Id.*

Petitioner has not shown that: (1) the “FDA Transcript” (Ex. 1107) of Ground 1; and (2) the “MD Anderson Newsletters” (Exs. 1163 and 1103) of Grounds 2 and 3 were prior art printed publications.

A. Petitioner Fails To Establish That Ex. 1107 (“FDA Transcript”) Is A Printed Publication

Petitioner offers no evidence, and does not attempt to argue, that the “FDA Transcript” was ever actually disseminated before the priority date. Instead, Petitioner attempts to show that an interested POSA would have been able to locate it. But the sole alleged evidence of the “Transcript’s” purported public accessibility is Ex. 1154, a non-public letter from Ms. Dynna Bigby (the “Bigby Letter”) that fails to establish the “Transcript” as publicly accessible such “that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art[,] exercising reasonable diligence, [could] locate it.” *SRI Int’l*, 511 F.3d at 1194.

The Bigby Letter is an unsworn FOIA Response letter—apparently generated in 2016 for this proceeding—addressing a request for “documentation to

show that an advisory committee transcript was made available to the public on a specific date.” Ex. 1154, 001. But the Bigby Letter provides no evidence whatsoever that the “Transcript” was catalogued or indexed such that a POSA exercising reasonable diligence could have located it. Without such evidence, the “Transcript” cannot be considered sufficiently available to the public to constitute a printed publication. *In re Cronyn*, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining that references are not printed publications where they have not been publicly disseminated and have “not been either cataloged or indexed in a meaningful way”).

The unsworn Bigby Letter, which lacks foundation to establish that Bigby has any personal knowledge regarding the assertions therein, states only that as of July 2016, the FDA had a copy of the “Transcript,” and “[a]ccording to the procedures in place in 1997, the Division of Dockets Management (DDM) *would have* received the transcript on that [1997] date.” Ex. 1154, 001 (emphasis added).⁷ The Bigby Letter states that “[f]ollowing August 8, 1997, any member of

⁷ Notably, the Bigby Letter provides no evidence that the identified procedures that supposedly “would have” been followed were in fact followed for this particular document.

the public *could have* requested and received a copy of the transcript in question by filling out a reading room request form.” *Id.* (emphasis added).

The Bigby Letter is silent regarding how a POSA allegedly would have known that the “Transcript” was available in the DDM reading room in the first place—or even that it existed at all. Petitioner offers no evidence that the hearing allegedly transcribed was “advertised or otherwise announced to the public,” much less identified as a hearing for which a transcript would be made. *Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. v. Rembrandt Wireless Technology*, IPR2014-00514 (Paper 18) at 6-7 (Sept. 9, 2014). Nor does Petitioner offer evidence that the contents of the DDM reading room was in any way searchable by the public, or that a POSA would have been aware of the DDM request process and how to follow it.

Even if it could be assumed that there was some search capability in the DDM reading room, that would not be enough to establish discoverability without details of such capability. In *In re Lister*, the Federal Circuit held that an article in a Copyright Office database that was searchable only by the author’s last name and first word of the article’s title was not sufficiently publicly accessible to be a printed publication. 583 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Here, the “Transcript” is titled only “Biological Response Modifiers Advisory Committee Nineteenth Meeting.” Ex. 1107, 001. Even if the transcript had been indexed by title (the Bigby letter does not contend that it was), the title would have failed to inform a

POSA because it “bears no relationship to the subject” matter discussed therein. *In re Cronyn*, 890 F.2d at 1161.

Thus, the Bigby Letter provides no evidence that interested persons would have been able to locate the “Transcript,” even with diligent effort. *Blue Calypso, LLC*, 815 F.3d at 1350; *see also, Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso LLC*, CBM2013-00044, 2014 WL 7273564 at *11 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 17, 2014) (finding that a paper was not a printed publication where it “was only available for ‘viewing and downloading’ to members of the public who happened to know that the [] paper was there”). In effect, the “Transcript” is like a “poster[] at a vacant and unpublicized conference . . . available only to a person who may have [come across it] by happenstance or knew about [it] via unpublicized means.” *SRI Int’l*, 511 F.3d at 1197.

Not only does the Bigby letter fail to establish that the “Transcript” was discoverable, it confirms that, if anything, the “Transcript” was not actually disseminated. It states that “[n]o requests were received for the transcript.” Ex. 1154, 001. Thus, Petitioner fails to carry its burden of establishing that the “Transcript” constitutes a printed publication.⁸

⁸ Dr. Andreeff’s testimony adds nothing. Citing only the Bigby letter, he simply states that “[t]he hearing was transcribed and, as confirmed by an official of

B. Petitioner Fails To Establish That Exhibit 1163 (“MD Anderson Print Newsletter”) and Exhibit 1103 (“MD Anderson Online Newsletter”) Are Printed Publications

1. Ex. 1163 (“MD Anderson Print Newsletter”)

Relying *only* on the testimony of Dr. Andreeff,⁹ Petitioner asserts that (i) “[i]n July 1998, MD Anderson published in print the Summer 1998 edition of its Leukemia Insights Newsletter (‘MD Anderson Print Newsletter’)” and (ii) “MD Anderson distributed printed copies of the MD Anderson Print Newsletter to several thousand Hematology-Oncology physicians in the U.S.” Pet. 28 (citing Ex. 1105, ¶¶79-81). But Dr. Andreeff does not purport to have any firsthand knowledge of this alleged publication or distribution.

Testimony regarding public availability of a document that is not based on firsthand knowledge does not establish dissemination sufficient to qualify a

the FDA, made available to the public on August 8, 1997.” Ex. 1105, ¶65. Dr. Andreeff does not claim to have any knowledge, personal or otherwise, beyond the Bigby letter.

⁹ Dr. Andreeff was employed by MD Anderson which, as noted above in Section II.B, conducted the CLL study described in the inventors’ synopsis under contract with Patent Owner. Dr. Andreeff does not qualify as a “member of the public.”

document as a printed publication. *See Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.*, 363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding “lack of substantial evidence of actual availability” where “there was testimony that it was the general practice at IADR meetings for presenters to hand out abstracts to interested attendees,” but the witness “could not recall whether copies of the Abstract [in question] were actually available to hand out”); *Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH, et al., v. Biogen Inc.* (Ex. 2010), IPR2015-00418 (Paper 14) at 11 (July 13, 2015) (finding Petitioner’s contention regarding the public accessibility of a document was unpersuasive because it was based on an expert’s testimony that did not assert any “firsthand knowledge of how, specifically, the [documents at issue] were distributed”).

Dr. Andreeff concedes that his information is secondhand, stating only that he “understand[s] from Ms. Pierce” that a newsletter was mailed out to referring physicians. Ex. 1105, ¶81.¹⁰ Dr. Andreeff does not assert that he was involved in this alleged publication or distribution. He does not even assert that the “Newsletter” was “published in print” in July 1998 or that he received a copy of it in July 1998. Instead, Dr. Andreeff asserts that “[i]n 1998, doctors with patients

¹⁰ Dr. Andreeff does not even state that Ms. Pierce claims to have mailed a copy of the “Newsletter.”

seeking treatment for CLL routinely turned to MD Anderson to inquire about ongoing clinical trials” and speculates that as part of the clinical trial process “the Newsletter was disseminated to referring physicians, and they were free to share the information with their prospective patients.” *Id.*, ¶83. These statements are merely hypothetical. Dr. Andreeff does not state that he disseminated the “Newsletter” to any referring physicians; nor does he identify a single example of another physician disseminating the “Newsletter.” Even assuming Dr. Andreeff was motivated to “spread the word about the Newsletters,” it does not follow that Dr. Andreeff actually disseminated the “Newsletter” as a matter of fact. *Id.*, ¶84.¹¹

Further, there is no competent evidence that the “Newsletter” was mailed to anyone, let alone several thousand physicians in the Summer of 1998. For example, Petitioner does not identify when any newsletter supposedly was mailed, who supposedly mailed it, and who the recipients supposedly were (e.g., a mailing list). Petitioner does not even submit a mailed copy of the “Newsletter.” There is, in fact, no evidence that more than a single copy of the “Newsletter” exists.

If anything, Dr. Andreeff’s testimony makes clear that Ex. 1163 was *not* distributed to several thousand physicians and is *not* even an accurate copy of the

¹¹ Of course, distribution of *information* contained in the “Newsletter” would not establish that the “Newsletter” itself was disseminated.

newsletter that allegedly was distributed by MD Anderson. Dr. Andreeff states that he “obtained [Exhibit 1163] from Ms. Pierce” who allegedly “retrieved [Ex. 1163] from her files as [Dr. Andreeff] stood beside her.” Ex. 1105, ¶80. Dr. Andreeff does not contend that Ms. Pierce obtained Ex. 1163 from someone outside of MD Anderson who received a copy in the mail. Rather, Ex. 1163 was allegedly always maintained in Ms. Pierce’s files.

Further, Dr. Andreeff acknowledges that “the original printed date on [Exhibit 1163] appears to be ‘Summer 1997’” but that date was changed to “‘Summer 1998’ by hand.” Ex. 1105, ¶80. He reports that Ms. Pierce “explained that the originally printed date of ‘1997’ was a mistake, and in the copy from her files, she had corrected the mistake by her own hand.” *Id.* According to Dr. Andreeff, “Ms. Pierce did not catch that mistake in her review of the pre-print.” *Id.* “She only caught the mistake after the Newsletter had been mailed, and she changed the date on her copy for her MD Anderson files.” *Id.* Thus, even assuming the “MD Anderson Newsletter” was mailed, Ex. 1163 is not an accurate copy of what was mailed.

2. Ex. 1103 (“MD Anderson Online Newsletter”)

Petitioner offers no evidence, and does not attempt to argue, that the “MD Anderson Online Newsletter” was ever disseminated before the priority date. Instead, Petitioner attempts to show that an interested POSA would have been able

to locate it because it allegedly was posted online before the priority date. But Petitioner has not established any such online posting or that the “Newsletter” was sufficiently publicly accessible such “that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art[,] exercising reasonable diligence, [could] locate it.” *See SRI Int’l*, 511 F.3d at 1194.

a) Petitioner Fails To Establish That The “Newsletter” Was Posted To The Internet On Or Before July 2, 1998

Petitioner alleges that Ex. 1103 is a copy of “[t]he Summer 1998 edition of the MD Anderson Online Newsletter” as it “appear[ed] in the Internet Archive Wayback Machine beginning February 8, 1999.” Pet. 28-29. But February 8, 1999 was several months *after* the November 9, 1998 priority date.

Unable to produce any alleged archive data before the priority date, Petitioner points to the notation “Last modified on July 2, 1998” on the document allegedly from February 8, 1999, and to Dr. Andreeff’s speculative testimony regarding the same. This is insufficient to establish that the “Newsletter” was publicly available on or before July 2, 1998.

According to Petitioner, “Dr. Andreeff explains that the content of the online newsletter would have been publicly available online as of the date of this ‘last modified’ date.” Pet. 29. But Dr. Andreeff offers no such explanation. Instead, Dr. Andreeff merely states that the last modified date supposedly is “*consistent* with

[his] understanding that both the printed and online Newsletter were published around July 2, 1998.” Ex. 1105, ¶82 (emphasis added). This is circular. Dr. Andreeff does not provide any basis for believing “that both the print and online Newsletter were published around July 2, 1998” in the first place. *Id.* For example, Dr. Andreeff does not testify that he reviewed the “Newsletter” online in July 1998 or that he was involved in making the “Newsletter” available online at that time. Nor does Dr. Andreeff contend that the “Newsletter” actually *was* publicly available online as of this date.

Moreover, the “[l]ast modified” notation on the February 8, 1999 document is by no means determinative. Petitioner essentially argues that any webpage bearing a “last modified” date should *per se* be deemed publicly accessible—and therefore a printed publication—as of that date. There is no such *per se* rule. *I-Blason LLC v. Aevoe Corp.*, IPR2016-00231 (Paper 9) at 5 (July 25, 2016) (finding that Petitioners failed to show that a document was a printed publication even though the relevant web page included the notation “last modified on February 2, 1999”). The cases cited by Petitioner do not suggest otherwise.

Petitioner cites *BLD Services, LLC v. LMK Technologies.*, but the Board did not rely on a last modified date in that case. IPR2014-00770 (Paper 40) (Nov. 18, 2015). Rather, the Board found that sufficient evidence had been presented to establish that a reference, the De Neef Brochure, was publicly accessible where the

petitioner submitted evidence “that De Neef Brochure was made available as a PDF file on the internet by at least January 1, 2007,” which was nearly nine months *after* the date last modified in the metadata of the PDF. *Id.* at 16 (indicating that the PDF “was last modified on ‘03/13/2006 6:57:02 PM’”). Moreover, the patent owner in that case did not contest that the brochure was published on the Internet by January 1, 2007. *Id.* If anything, therefore, *BLD Services* highlights that the last modified date should *not* be relied on to establish the date a webpage was posted online.

In *Stamps.com Inc. v. Endicia Inc.*, the last modified date was just one factor considered by the Federal Circuit. 437 F. App’x 897, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “Other evidence confirmed the public availability of the article,” including that “the article was catalogued by Carnegie Mellon University and listed as available on its indexed website in 1993 as ‘CMU–CS–93–107.ps.Z.’” *Id.* “Significantly, [the last modified] date is several weeks *after* the date appearing in the article itself, suggesting that the website was not simply parroting the date appearing in the article.” *Id.* (emphasis added). If anything, therefore, like *BLD Services*, *Stamps.com* highlights that the last modified date should not be relied on to establish a date posted.

b) The Butler Affidavit Fails To Establish Even That The “Online Newsletter” Was Actually Available On The Internet On February 8, 1999

Relying on the December 20, 2016 Affidavit of Christopher Butler (Ex. 1164) and its statements regarding how “[t]he Internet Archive assigns a URL on its site,” Petitioner argues that Ex. 1103 was available online on February 8, 1999. Pet. 29 n.10. But the Butler declaration nowhere addresses Ex. 1103, and Petitioner offers no evidence that Ex. 1103 even came from the Internet Archive. Instead, Petitioner simply refers to “(Ex. 1103; accessed December 14, 2016).” Pet. 29. Notably, the URL appearing in the footer of Ex. 1103 differs from the URL of the document attached as Exhibit A to the Butler Affidavit. *Compare* Ex. 1103, 001 *with* Ex. 1164, 004. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to establish that Ex. 1103 (or even Exhibit A to the Butler Affidavit) was posted to the Internet on or before February 8, 1999.

c) Petitioner Has Not Established That The “Online Newsletter” Was Searchable Or Discoverable

Even assuming the “Newsletter” was posted on a website as of July 2, 1998 or February 8, 1999, the Petitioner fails to present evidence demonstrating that a POSA or interested member of the public exercising reasonable diligence would have located it. For example, Petitioner offers no evidence regarding how any such website appeared on either date, or at any time before the priority date. Instead, Petitioner offers only what it contends is a single page from the website—in

isolation. Ex. 1103.

Furthermore, Petitioner fails to offer evidence that any such website, any page on any such website, or any “Newsletter” posted to any such website, was indexed, catalogued, or searchable, let alone was a source that a POSA would seek out or search in the first place.¹²

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to establish that an interested researcher exercising reasonable diligence would have found any “Online Newsletter” before the priority date. This is fatal to Petitioner’s argument that the “Online Newsletter” constitutes a printed publication. *See, e.g., Blue Calypso, LLC*, 815 F.3d at 1349 (rejecting an argument that “an internet search engine would have been able to locate” a reference because the “record is devoid of any evidence that a query of a search engine before the critical date, using any combination of search words, would have led to the [reference] appearing in the search results”); *Microsoft Corp. v. Bradium Techs, LLC*, IPR2015-01435 (Paper 15) at 15-16 (Dec. 23, 2015)

¹² General statements about “turn[ing] to MD Anderson to inquire about [] on-going trials,” even if true, do not establish that a POSA would have made such inquiry through a website, or by consulting any “Newsletter,” much less that a POSA would have located any such website, or any “Newsletter” on such website, in the first place. *Cf.* Ex. 1105, ¶83.

(rejecting a petitioner’s argument that the Wayback Machine established a document as a printed publication and denying institution); *Cisco Sys. v. Constellation Techs.*, IPR2014-00871 (Paper 12) at 9 (Dec. 19, 2012) (finding an exhibit did not qualify as a printed publication even though it had been available on the Internet before the critical date because the petitioners did not present evidence that “those interested in the art” would have known how to find the document).

VI. NO REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE ’612 PATENT ARE UNPATENTABLE

A. Ground 1: The Claims Are Not Obvious Over Czuczman, The “FDA Transcript,” Batata, And Maloney

Petitioner argues that all challenged claims are obvious over Czuczman, the “FDA Transcript,” Batata, and Maloney. The Board should reject this argument on multiple grounds.

1. Petitioner Fails To Establish That The “FDA Transcript” Was A Prior Art Printed Publication (All Challenged Claims)

Because Petitioner has not established that the “FDA Transcript” was a prior art printed publication, as explained in Section V.A, Ground 1 fails. *See Coalition for Affordable Drugs VIII, LLC v. Trustees of Univ. of Pennsylvania*, IPR2015-01835 (Paper 56) at 21-22 (Mar. 6, 2017).

2. **None Of Czuczman, “FDA Transcript,” Batata, Or Maloney Discloses Effectively Treating CLL Patients By Administering An Anti-CD20 Antibody (All Challenged Claims)**

Even assuming the “FDA Transcript” qualified as a prior art printed publication, Ground 1 would fail because it is premised on two fallacies: (1) that the “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman reported clinically meaningful results for administering rituximab to IWF Type A NHL patients; and (2) that those IWF Type A NHL patients were “SLL/CLL” patients. *See* Pet. 40-41.

a) **The “FDA Transcript” And Czuczman Did Not Report Clinically Meaningful Results for Administering Rituximab To IWF Type A NHL**

As set forth in Section IV.B above, “effective to treat the chronic lymphocytic leukemia” requires that the treatment “provid[e] a positive clinical benefit to the chronic lymphocytic leukemia patient.” The “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman do not show that rituximab tends to provide a positive clinical benefit even to SLL patients, let alone CLL patients.

i. The “FDA Transcript”

Petitioner argues that rituximab had been shown to be effective in IWF Type A patients based on comments in the “FDA Transcript” about the results of a “pivotal study” in patients with low grade or follicular lymphoma (IWF Type A-D). Ex. 1107, 036; Pet. 34-36. That study had particular “efficacy endpoints” agreed to in advance with the FDA. Ex. 1107, 037. The “primary efficacy

endpoint[.]” was the “overall response rate[.] with a goal of 35 to 40 percent.” *Id.* “As [Patent Owner] discussed with CBER [FDA’s Center for Biological Evaluation and Research], a clinically meaningful result meant that you had to have an overall response rate of greater than or equal to 35 to 40 percent, a complete response rate of greater than or equal to 15 percent, and response duration of greater than or equal to 6 months.” *Id.* at 083.

The “Transcript” reports that in the pivotal study, the “overall response rate [was] 97 of 203 patients, that is, 48 percent,” *id.* at 040, with “IWF Types B, C, and D patients [showing] a higher overall response rate of 58 percent.” *Id.* at 043.

“[T]he study was not designed to show what the response rate was in the [IWF] Class A patients,” *id.* at 068, which Petitioner equates to “SLL/CLL” patients, but the “Transcript” reported that those IWF Type A patients had a much “lower overall response rate at 11 percent.” *Id.* at 044. Only “4 out of 37” IWF Type A patients responded. *Id.* at 117. The IWF Type A patients, as a group, therefore failed to meet (or even come close to meeting) the agreed-upon overall primary efficacy endpoint of 35 to 40 percent responders, and failed to achieve “a clinically meaningful result” under the definition articulated in the study itself. *Id.* at 037, 083.

Notwithstanding the failure of Type A patients to achieve the agreed upon primary efficacy endpoint, Petitioner argues that, according to Dr. Grillo-Lopez,

“these [Type A] patients, however, do have important clinical benefit,’ including ‘some tumor shrinkage’ in 28 of the 37 Type A patients.” Pet. 35 (quoting Ex. 1107, 044-45). But Dr. Grillo-Lopez makes clear in the “Transcript” that he was using the term “clinical benefit” broadly to encompass “some biological effect” on the patient. Ex. 1107, 071 (stating “so there is *some clinical benefit*, there is *some biological effect* as manifested by the tumor reduction”) (emphasis added). To be “effective” according to the claims of the ’612 patent, however, a therapy must have more than just “some biological effect;” it must “provid[e] a positive clinical benefit,” as discussed in Section IV.B above.

Petitioner also argues that comments in the “Transcript” attributed to Dr. Ellin Berman allegedly evidence that rituximab was deemed effective to treat IWF Type A patients. Pet. 35-36. But, in fact, those comments were made precisely because no clinically meaningful results had been shown. Dr. Berman’s comments appear as part of a discussion of whether to *carve out* Type A patients from any FDA approval, given the paltry 11 percent (4 out of 37) overall response rate observed for such patients.

Three members of the Biological Response Modifiers Advisory Committee addressed this issue: Dr. Berman, Dr. Carole Miller, and Dr. Virginia Broudy. All three recommended no carve out. Dr. Berman opined that “11 percent is not to be disregarded” in the context of the discussion, “[s]o I would say that it does provide

sufficient evidence of efficacy” to support not affirmatively carving off Type A patients notwithstanding the absence of clinically meaningful results. Ex. 1107, 117. According to the “Transcript,” Dr. Miller stated that she “wouldn’t break it down any further and say exclude[] this subgroup,” but made clear that separate trials in the Type A patient population were needed. *Id.* (“I think whether or not what the long-term responses are going to be will be in other clinical practice trials that hopefully will be done in these patient populations.”). Dr. Broudy warned: “I don’t think we really have adequate data in this subgroup.” *Id.* at 117-118. But she added: “I guess I would also not X these patients out, although I think it probably should say in the package insert that there was an 11 percent response rate in the initial trial with so many patients, and then the clinician can make his or her own judgment about whether to use this agent or not.” *Id.* at 118.

Thus, these individuals did not agree that rituximab had produced clinically meaningful results in IWF Type A patients. They merely agreed that IWF Type A should not affirmatively be excluded from a broader lymphoma indication to be approved.

ii. Czuczman

Petitioner argues that “Czuczman discloses that rituximab administered at 375 mg/m² in combination with CHOP chemotherapy yielded the beneficial therapeutic 100% response rate in all patents completing all therapy.” Pet. 40.

Czuczman sets forth “[p]reliminary data from a novel chemoimmunotherapeutic approach of treating low-grade lymphoma with standard-dose CHOP and [rituximab].” Ex. 1111, 003 . Undifferentiated, interim results from a group of fourteen patients, including four IWF Type A patients, are reported. *Id.* Eleven patients had completed all scheduled therapy with an “[o]verall response rate for the [eleven] patients completing all scheduled therapy [of] 100% (8 complete remission—CR and 3 PR).” Ex. 1111, 003. Czuczman does not, however, report how many of the eleven patients completing therapy were IWF Type A patients. As there were only four IWF Type A patients in the group of fourteen, of which eleven completed all scheduled therapy and responded, the response rate in IWF Type A patients could be as low as one in four.

b) IWF Type A Patients Disclosed In The “FDA Transcript” And Czuczman Were Not CLL Patients

Petitioner relies on the “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman as alleged evidence that rituximab was effective to treat CLL. Pet. 37. But Petitioner fails to show that any of the trials described in the “FDA Transcript” or Czuczman included CLL patients. In fact, the trials described in the “FDA Transcript” *explicitly excluded* CLL patients. And Czuczman notes that four “IWF A” patients were included in its study but does not state or suggest that any of these patients were CLL patients—Czuczman reported results in low-grade *lymphoma* patients. Ex. 1111, 002-003.

The “FDA Transcript” reports on results from the studies reported in Maloney (Sept. 1997) and McLaughlin. Pet. 34. Both studies expressly excluded CLL patients based on a “>5,000 lymphocyte/ μ L” threshold to define CLL—the same threshold found in Patent Owner’s proposed construction for “chronic lymphocytic leukemia.” Ex. 1115, 008. (reporting that “patients with chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL) were excluded from this trial (based on the presence of >5,000 lymphocytes/ μ l for this histologic subgroup)”; Ex. 1116, 004 (“Patients with chronic lymphocytic leukemia (lymphocytes $>5 \times 10^9/L$) were excluded.”); *see also* Ex. 1107, 081 (“No patients with CLL were included . . .”).

Petitioner tries to blur the line between CLL and SLL, seizing on the descriptions of patients as “IWF Type A patients” and stating that “IWF Type A patients were SLL/CLL.” Pet. 41. But the “FDA Transcript” itself demonstrates that skilled artisans maintained the distinction between SLL and CLL, and recognized that the patients in the pivotal trial were SLL patients, not CLL patients. For example, Dr. Broudy refers in the “FDA Transcript” to “the lower response rate in *the Working Formulation A, the small lymphocytic lymphoma patients*” in the pivotal trial. Ex. 1107, 068 (emphasis added).

Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the “FDA Transcript” does not “explicitly contemplate[] the use of rituximab to treat patients diagnosed with CLL.” Pet. 42.

Dr. Grillo-Lopez's statement about "also look[ing] at a small group of CLL patients" does not refer to study results from CLL patients who received rituximab, but rather to laboratory results characterizing CLL itself. Ex. 1107, 069. He made the statement in response to a question about whether the lower response rate in the "Working Formulation A, the small lymphocytic lymphoma patients [in the pivotal trial] . . . relates to the density of the CD20." *Id.* at 068. Dr. Grillo-Lopez answered in the affirmative, reporting that "when we looked at our entire database of low-grade lymphoma patients and compared them to the Class A's, the Class A's tend to have a lower antigen density on the cell surface." *Id.* at 069. Dr. Grillo-Lopez then noted that "a lower and more heterogeneous CD20 expression" also was observed in "a small group of CLL patients, samples that we obtained courtesy of Dr. Susan O'Brien from M.D. Anderson Hospital." *Id.* That statement does not suggest that the studies reported in the "FDA Transcript" included CLL patients (they explicitly did not) or that further studies should.

Dr. Berman's statement that the pivotal trial "presumably" included "some [patients] with a lymphomatous phase of CLL," *id.* at 117, is a reference to patients with SLL, not CLL. "Lymphomatous" means "[p]ert[aining] to a lymphoma." Ex. 2009, 004. As Petitioner's own expert explains, patients with SLL have *lymphoma*; patients with CLL have *leukemia*. See Ex. 1105, ¶25.

The “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman simply do not disclose or suggest treating CLL patients with rituximab. And Petitioner nowhere even contends, let alone demonstrates, that Batata or Maloney does either.

3. Petitioner Fails To Establish A Motivation To Combine Czuczman, The “FDA Transcript,” Batata, And Maloney

Petitioner also fails to show “that a skilled artisan would have had reason to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention.” *In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig.*, 676 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

a) No Motivation To Treat CLL (All Challenged Claims)

Petitioner argues that “[t]he success of rituximab at treating low-grade NHL patients generally, as described in the FDA Transcript, and the success of rituximab with chemotherapy to treat low-grade NHL patients, as described in Czuczman, would have led a POSA to use rituximab with chemotherapy to treat CLL.” Pet. 42. But CLL and SLL are *not* the same disease, *see* Section II.A, and the “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman do *not* even disclose that rituximab was deemed effective to treat SLL. *See* Section VI.A.2.a).

Moreover, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, a POSA would not have been motivated to use rituximab to treat CLL “based on the results of rituximab studies in NHL patients” generally. Pet. 42. Petitioner argues otherwise based on (1) a “1995 Genentech press release” that states: “Genentech and IDEC are planning

additional studies . . . in other B-cell mediated cancers such as intermediate grade NHL and chronic lymphocytic leukemia,” Ex. 1134, 002; (2) a “1996 IDEC/Genentech press release” that states: “Genentech and IDEC are committed to exploring further uses for [rituximab], both as a frontline therapy, and in combination with other anti-cancer treatments,” Ex. 1165, 002 (internal quotation marks omitted); and (3) an abstract describing “clinical trial results of rituximab in low-grade NHL patients.” Ex. 1157, 003.

As an initial matter, Petitioner does nothing to establish that either of these “press releases” (Ex. 1134 or 1165) was “disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons interested and ordinarily skilled in the subject matter or art exercising reasonable diligence” could have located it, *SRI Int’l*, 511 F.3d at 1194, and therefore fails to demonstrate that either Ex. 1134 or 1165 is a prior art printed publication.

In any event, these cites are nothing more than statements that further study is required and are insufficient to establish a motivation to combine. *Boehringer Ingelheim International GMBH, et al., v. Biogen Inc.* (Ex. 2010), IPR2015-00418 (Paper 14) at 18 (July 13, 2015) (holding disclosures that “at best, ***suggest potential rituximab treatments that require further study***” were insufficient to establish motivation to combine) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The abstract reports that rituximab “produces less effect [in] the [CLL/SLL lymphoma]

subgroup[]” with only one of eleven patients demonstrating a response. Ex. 1157, 003. Petitioner provides no explanation why a trial demonstrating that rituximab was “less effective[]” in SLL than other low-grade NHL lymphomas would have motivated a POSA to use rituximab in CLL.

Moreover, by the priority date, Jensen et al. had actually tried treating CLL with rituximab and the results were abysmal. As discussed in Section IV.B.1, Jensen is a “Rapid Communication” designed to warn POSAs that following administration of rituximab, a patient experienced severe side effects, including TLS, Ex. 1138, 003-004, which is potentially life-threatening. *See* Ex. 2006. Petitioner tries to downplay this warning by arguing that “[a] POSA would have anticipated the likelihood of TLS when attacking CLL and would have employed known techniques to minimize TLS.” Pet. 43. That argument does not address Jensen’s report that rituximab was also *ineffective* to treat CLL. Even after the administration of three further infusions of rituximab, the TLS patient had “progressive disease.” Ex. 1138, 004 (reporting no effectiveness for any other patient either). A POSA would rate progressive disease as a “treatment failure.” Ex. 1122, 008. Thus, Jensen would have discouraged a POSA from trying to use rituximab to treat CLL as of the priority date.

**b) No Motivation To Combine With Chemotherapy
(All Challenged Claims)**

Jensen would have also discouraged a POSA from trying to use rituximab in combination with chemotherapy to treat CLL as of the priority date. Like rituximab alone, chemotherapy alone has the potential to cause TLS or other infusion-related toxicities. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 2011, 001. A POSA would therefore have been concerned that combining rituximab together with chemotherapy would exacerbate the potential for serious side effects, leaving patients even worse off than those seen in Jensen, where rituximab was administered alone.

A 2003 article authored by Byrd et al. (Ex. 2012)¹³ illustrates the concern that a POSA would have had about the risk of infusion-related toxicities associated with rituximab in CLL patients upon reading Jensen's "Rapid Communication:"

One concern about the use of rituximab in CLL is infusion related toxicity. This concern arises from several studies demonstrating that rituximab can cause severe infusion-related toxicity in a minority of patients and that a high number of circulating tumor cells might predispose patients to this.

Ex. 2012, 006.

¹³ Grounds 2 and 3 rely on a prior article authored by Byrd, among others.

Ex. 1110.

Czuczman does not address this concern, or provide a motivation to combine rituximab and chemotherapy for the treatment of CLL. Czuczman describes results from a clinical trial using rituximab in combination with CHOP in low-grade lymphoma patients, not CLL patients. Compared to the “severe side effects” observed when rituximab was administered to a CLL patient, Ex. 1138, 003, rituximab had only “mild to moderate toxicity” in low grade lymphoma patients. Ex. 1111, 003. Accordingly, a POSA would not have been motivated to combine rituximab with chemotherapy to treat CLL.

c) No Motivation To Increase Dose (Claims 28 and 29)

The trials described in the “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman administered rituximab at infusions of “375 mg/m².” Ex. 1107, 036; Ex. 1111, 003. Certain challenged claims of the ’612 patent require administration of a high dose of an anti-CD20 antibody, such as rituximab, to CLL patients. For example, claim 29 requires that “the anti-CD20 antibody is administered to the patient at a dosage of about 500 mg/m².”

Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have been motivated to dose rituximab at 500 mg/m²” based on the “Transcript” and Maloney. Pet. 44. But the IWF Type A patients disclosed in the “FDA Transcript” were SLL patients, not CLL patients, as discussed in Section VI.A.2.b) above. Indeed, CLL patients were excluded from the reported trials. *See id.* And Maloney did not administer 500

mg/m² doses of rituximab to any CLL patients—or SLL patients, for that matter. Ex. 1109, 005 (indicating the SLL patient was administered 50 mg/m² dose). Accordingly, a POSA would not have drawn from either the “Transcript” or from Maloney any motivation to administer rituximab to CLL patients at doses of 500 mg/m².

By the priority date in November 1998, the art taught away from—or at the very least provided no motivation to try—administering 375 mg/m² rituximab to CLL patients, let alone a higher dose. Jensen disclosed that even a 375 mg/m² dose was ineffective in CLL patients and caused dangerous side effects, as discussed in Section IV.B.1. In fact, Jensen expressly taught that such a “dose might be *too high* for the treatment of patients with substantial peripheral tumor load,” such as CLL patients. Ex. 1138, 004 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a POSA would have understood that, if anything, the 375 mg/m² dose should be *decreased*. Notably, Byrd described that after studies of another antibody “Campath-1” were almost “abandoned” due to severe side effects in CLL patients, studies using “lower doses” were planned. Ex. 1110, 008.

d) No Motivation To Administer Biweekly Or Monthly (Claims 41 and 42)

Petitioner fails to demonstrate that a POSA would have arrived at the biweekly or monthly schedules of claims 41 and 42 by combining the references of Ground 1. Petitioner asserts that a POSA would have arrived at biweekly and

monthly dosing schedules by routine optimization, but fails to make the required showing. There are at least five requirements that must be satisfied in order for “routine optimization” to apply to a variable, and Petitioner fails to establish that these requirements are satisfied.

First, the result of the “optimization” process must in fact be an “optimum value” for the variable. *In re Antonie*, 559 F.2d 518, 620 (C.C.P.A. 1977); *In re Aller*, 220 F.2d 454, 458 (C.C.P.A. 1955). Petitioner never even asserts, much less submits evidence demonstrating, that either of the claimed biweekly or monthly administration schedule is in fact “an optimum,” let alone that both are optimums—to the extent that is even possible.

Second, the variable being optimized must have been “**known**” to be “**result-effective**.” *In re Antonie*, 559 F.2d at 620 (rejecting a routine optimization argument because “the parameter optimized was not recognized to be a result-effective variable”) (emphasis added). Petitioner does not contend the administration schedule was considered “result effective,” much less that a POSA knew how this variable allegedly affects results. *See id.*; *In re Yates*, 663 F.2d 1054, 1056 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (rejecting a routine optimization argument because the allegedly optimized parameter “was not recognized to be a result-effective variable”).

Third, the evidence must show that the experimentation needed to optimize the variable was also known in the art. *In re Fay*, 347 F.2d 597, 602 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (“To support the board’s decision that ‘routine experimentation within the teachings of the art’ will defeat patentability requires a primary determination of whether or not appellants’ experimentation comes *within the teachings of the art.*”) (emphasis in original). Petitioner fails to provide any evidence describing the experimentation process that allegedly would have been needed to arrive at the claimed dose schedule, much less evidence that such experimentation was known in the art.

Fourth, the prior art must “have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this [experimentation] process should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in light of the prior art.” *Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc.*, 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (internal quotes omitted). Petitioner identifies no such suggestions in the art.

Fifth, the experimentation required to arrive at the claimed optimum must, as the label “routine optimization” implies, be no more than routine. *Id.* Petitioner fails to submit evidence establishing that any such experimentation would have been merely routine.

There is, therefore, no evidence that a POSA would have arrived at the claimed biweekly or monthly dose schedule through routine optimization and

Petitioner's argument fails. Petitioner is actually relying on hindsight, not routine optimization. This is impermissible. *See, e.g., St. Jude Med., Inc. v. Access Closure, Inc.*, 729 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e must guard against hindsight bias and *ex post* reasoning.”) (internal quotes and cites omitted).

Petitioner's reliance on a statement by Dr. Schenkein in a European Opposition proceeding is misguided. Ex. 1149, 003. Dr. Scheinkein was addressing whether biweekly or monthly dosages were “directly and unambiguously disclosed” by, and would have been readily adopted based on, a European counterpart to the '612 patent—not based on any prior art. *Id.* at 001. As explained by Dr. Schenkein, “the use of ‘increased dosage’ (500-1500 mg/m²) rituximab for CLL was an important technical contribution of the patent in November of 1998.” *Id.*

Jensen reported that the same weekly dosing schedule that was effective in NHL, resulted in treatment failure in a CLL patient. Ex. 1038, 003. In view of this failure, a POSA would have had no incentive to try an alternative, less frequent biweekly or monthly dosing schedule, let alone a reasonable expectation of success that such a schedule would be effective. On the contrary, a POSA would have understood that a less frequent schedule, such as a biweekly or monthly schedule, would be even less effective. Further, as Jensen taught that an effective NHL dosing schedule could be ineffective in CLL, a POSA would have no reason to

look to other NHL the dosing schedules, including the schedule set forth in Czuczman, when treating CLL.

4. Petitioner Fails To Establish A Reasonable Expectation Of Success In Effectively Treating CLL (All Challenged Claims)

Petitioner devotes a total of only three sentences to addressing reasonable expectation of success in connection with Ground 1. And all three sentences are directed to the two independent claims. Petitioner does not even attempt to establish any expectation of success for dependent claims 24-27 and 29, 30-32, 33-35 and 37, 38-42, 43-45, or 46-57. Ground 1 therefore fails for at least the dependent claims.

With respect to the independent claims, Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have understood Czuczman to demonstrate a significant therapeutic response” and “the FDA Transcript to demonstrate a detectable therapeutic response after four administrations of rituximab at 375 mg/m² in SLL/CLL patients[,]” and would have further understood “Maloney to teach the safety and efficacy of administering rituximab at doses ranging from 50 mg/m² to 500 mg/m².” Pet. 46. But none of Czuczman, the “FDA Transcript,” or Maloney discloses treating CLL patients, as discussed in Section VI.A.2.b). Further, the “FDA Transcript” and Czuczman do not demonstrate that rituximab is effective even to treat SLL, let alone CLL as discussed in Section VI.A.2.a). And the only

SLL patient in Maloney failed to achieve even a “Minor Response.” Ex. 1109, 005 (Table 1).¹⁴

Only one study published before the priority date reported results from administering rituximab to CLL patients, and that was Jensen. Ex. 1138. As discussed in Section IV.B.1, Jensen reported that rituximab was ineffective and caused dangerous side effects. Petitioner fails to establish that a POSA would somehow have expected rituximab to successfully treat CLL notwithstanding the treatment failure reported by Jensen.

B. Ground 2: The Claims Are Not Obvious Over Byrd And The “Newsletters”

Petitioner argues that “[a]ll the challenged claims are obvious under § 103 over Byrd (Ex. 1110) and the MD Anderson Online Newsletter (Ex. 1103)” or, in the alternative, over “Byrd and the MD Anderson Print Newsletter.” Pet. 53.

¹⁴ Similar results were reported in subsequent trials involving SLL patients before the priority date. For example, Maloney (Sept. 1997) reported that one SLL patient dropped out of the trial due to adverse events. Ex. 1115, 006. Of the four remaining SLL patients, none had a clinical remission. *Id.* at 007.

1. **Petitioner Fails To Establish That Any “MD Anderson Newsletters” Was A Prior Art Printed Publication (All Challenged Claims)**

As discussed in Section V.B, Petitioner fails to carry its burden of proving that either an online or print “MD Anderson Newsletter” was a prior art printed publication on which *inter partes* review may be based. *Cisco Sys. v. Constellation Techs.*, IPR2014-01085 (Paper 11) at 9 (Jan. 9, 2015). Ground 2 therefore fails.

2. **Petitioner Fails To Establish A Motivation To Combine The “Newsletters” And Byrd**

Even if the “Newsletters” were prior art—they are not—Petitioner would fail to demonstrate that a POSA would have been motivated to combine the “MD Anderson Newsletter” and Byrd to arrive at the claimed combinations.

a) **No Motivation to Combine With Chemotherapy (All Challenged Claims)**

Petitioner argues that Byrd “demonstrates that there existed an express motivation within the art to combine rituximab and fludarabine to treat CLL,” Pet. 58, and “[a] POSA seeking to implement [this] combination therapy for CLL patients would have turned to the rituximab dosing regimen described in the MD Anderson Online Newsletter as a matter of course in order to achieve enhanced therapeutic benefits.” *Id.*¹⁵ But Jensen teaches against trying to treat CLL with

¹⁵ The “Newsletters” propose administering rituximab alone, not in combination with chemotherapy.

rituximab at all, let alone in combination with chemotherapy, as discussed above in Section VI.A.3.b). Indeed, Jensen warned physicians that administering rituximab to CLL patients was ineffective; resulted in “severe side effects,” including “rapid tumor lysis syndrome” (TLS); and still resulted in progressive disease, Ex. 1138, 003-004—a treatment failure. Ex. 1122, 008. Like rituximab alone, chemotherapy alone has the potential to cause TLS or other infusion-related toxicities. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 2011, 001. A POSA would therefore have been concerned that combining rituximab together with chemotherapy would exacerbate the potential for serious side effects, leaving patients even worse off than those in Jensen, where rituximab was administered alone.

b) No Motivation To Increase Dose (Claims 28 and 29)

Petitioner argues that “[b]ased on the MD Anderson Online Newsletter, the specific 500 mg/m² dosage would have been a logical dose of rituximab to increase the effectiveness of the rituximab.” Pet. 58. But the “MD Anderson Newsletter” was allegedly published in July 1998. By the priority date, Jensen expressly taught that even a lower 375 mg/m² “dose might be *too high* for the treatment of patients with substantial peripheral tumor load,” such as CLL patients. Ex. 1138, 004 (emphasis added). Accordingly, as discussed in Section VI.A.3.c) above, a POSA would have understood that, if anything, it was appropriate to *decrease* the 375 mg/m² dose.

c) No Motivation To Administer Biweekly Or Monthly (Claims 41 and 42)

Petitioner argues that “[m]odifying the weekly dosing regimen of the MD Anderson Online Newsletter to a biweekly or monthly schedule would have been part of routine efforts to improve the regimen, once a POSA began using high doses of rituximab to treat CLL,” and that a POSA would have arrived at the dosing schedule by routine optimization. Pet. 62. But, as discussed in Section VI.A.3.d), there are at least five requirements that must be satisfied in order for “routine optimization” to apply to a variable, and Petitioner again fails to establish that these requirements are satisfied.

Instead, Petitioner again points to Dr. Schenkein’s statement, in a European Opposition proceeding. But, as discussed in Section VI.A.3.d), Dr. Scheinkein was addressing whether biweekly or monthly dosages were “directly and unambiguously disclosed” by, and would have been readily adopted based on, a European counterpart to the ’612 patent—not based on any prior art. *Id.* at 001.

The “MD Anderson Newsletter” proposes “4 weekly infusions” with no discussion whatsoever of a less frequent dosing schedule. Ex. 1103, 004. Jensen later reported that this same “4 weekly” dosing schedule resulted in treatment failure. Ex. 1138, 003. In view of the treatment failure reported in Jensen, a POSA would have had no incentive to try an alternative, less frequent biweekly or

monthly dosing schedule, let alone a reasonable expectation of success that such less frequent dosing schedule would be effective.

3. **Petitioner Fails To Establish A Reasonable Expectation of Success In Effectively Treating CLL (All Challenged Claims)**

Petitioner devotes a total of only two sentences to addressing reasonable expectation of success in connection with Ground 2. And both sentences are directed to the two independent claims. Petitioner does not even attempt to establish any expectation of success for dependent claims 24-27 and 29, 30-32, 33-35 and 37, 38-42, 43-45, or 46-57. Ground 2 therefore fails for at least the dependent claims.

i. **The Existence Of A Reasonable Expectation Of Success Cannot Be Assumed Based On The Initiation Of A Clinical Trial**

Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA would have had a reasonable expectation that combining rituximab with chemotherapy would be safe and efficacious to treat CLL” based on Byrd and the “Newsletters.” But Byrd states only that a study is being “plan[ned],” Ex. 1110, 006, and the “Newsletters” report that rituximab “is under investigation with CLL.” Ex. 1103, 004; *see also* Pet. 26. This does not establish a reasonable expectation of success. *See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.*, 619 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that a prior art reference disclosing a “bare proposal to use” the drug raloxifene in one clinical

setting “is insufficient to require a finding that an ordinary skilled artisan would have expected that a compound with . . . known clinical failures—would successfully treat any human condition”). It is well known that clinical trials are, in fact, routinely unsuccessful. *See* Ex. 2007, 009 (showing that oncology trials are the least likely of all to be successful). Solely initiating or planning a trial would not have led a POSA to expect success.

ii. **Jensen Taught That Administration Of Anti-CD20 Antibody Is Not Effective To Treat CLL**

Further, in view of Jensen, a POSA would not have had any reasonable expectation of success in combining rituximab with chemotherapeutic regimens to treat CLL. As discussed in Section IV.B.1, far from an effective treatment, Jensen reported that the same 375 mg/m² dose approved and used safely in NHL patients was ineffective and caused severe adverse events, including TLS. Ex. 1138, 003-004. Here, the claims require that rituximab is administered together with chemotherapy. A POSA would have understood this could exacerbate the already potentially life-threatening side-effects seen when rituximab was administered on its own, and would have avoided such combination. A POSA’s concerns would have been magnified if a higher dose of rituximab was administered in combination with chemotherapy as required by claims 28 and 29.

C. Ground 3: Claims 41 and 42 Are Not Obvious Over Byrd, The “Newsletters,” and Kipps

Petitioner argues that claims 41 and 42, which require that rituximab is administered biweekly and monthly, respectively, are obvious in light of the “Newsletters,” Byrd, and Kipps. Pet. 66. This Ground 3 relies on the references of Ground 2 plus Kipps, which Petitioner argues discloses biweekly and monthly chemotherapy administration. Pet. 65. Even assuming that were true, Ground 3 would fail for the same reasons Ground 2 fails.

Petitioner argues that “[a] POSA seeking to combine rituximab with standard chemotherapy for CLL would have understood that administration of rituximab could be modified to better align with chemotherapy administration.” Pet. 65. Petitioner’s argument relies on the assumption that a POSA would have been motivated to combine rituximab and chemotherapy to treat CLL in the first place. But, as discussed in Section VI.A.3.b), no such motivation existed. Because a POSA would not have been motivated to combine rituximab and chemotherapy to treat CLL, a POSA would have had no basis to modify the rituximab dosing schedule to “align with chemotherapy administration,” let alone a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. Moreover, in view of the treatment failure reported in Jensen with “weekly” dosing, a POSA would have had no incentive to try an alternative, less frequent biweekly or monthly dosing schedule, much less a reasonable expectation of success in doing so. *See* Section VI.A.3.d).

VII. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF *INTER PARTES* REVIEW

In *Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC*, 639 F. App'x 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016), *cert. granted*, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3727 (June 12, 2017), the Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of *inter partes* review proceedings. Patent Owner preserves the position that this *inter partes* review proceeding and the challenge to Patent Owner's duly issued and existing '612 patent violates the Constitution by allowing for private property rights to be extinguished through an adversarial process in the Patent and Trademark Office, a non-Article III forum, without a jury. *See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co.*, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898) (once a patent is granted, "[i]t has become the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as other property.").

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Board should not institute *inter partes* review under any of Petitioner's proposed Grounds.

Dated: July 24, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Michael R. Fleming

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH 37 C.F.R. § 42.24

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(d), I certify that the present paper contains 13,953 words as counted by the word-processing program used to generate the brief. This total does not include the tables of contents and authorities, the caption page, table of exhibits, certificate of service, or this certificate of word count.

Dated: July 24, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Pia Kamath

Pia Kamath

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.6, the undersigned certifies that on July 24, 2017 a copy of **BIOGEN INC. AND GENENTECH INC.'S PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE** and **EXHIBITS 2001 – 2013** were served in their entirety via electronic mail upon the following:

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